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NOTE
CIVIL RICO AND "GARDEN VARIETY"
FRAUD-A SUGGESTED ANALYSIS
Title 18, section 1964(c) of the United States Code,1 enacted
as part of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
(RICO),2 provides for a private right of action for treble damages
for any person injured in his business or property by reason of a
violation of section 1962 of the Code,' the substantive provision of
RICO.4 Liability under section 1962 is based on two novel concepts
in criminal jurisprudence: "a pattern of racketeering activity" and
"an enterprise." 5 A pattern of racketeering activity requires the
1 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1982). Section 1964(c) provides:
Any person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation of section
1962 of this chapter may sue therefor in any appropriate United States district
court and shall recover threefold the damages he sustains and the cost of the suit,
including a reasonable attorney's fee.
Id.
, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 52 (1970) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-
1968). RICO has been termed "perhaps the broadest federal criminal statute ever enacted."
Comment, Reading the "Enterprise" Element Back Into RICO: Sections 1962 and 1964(c),
76 Nw. U.L. REv. 100, 100 (1981); see Atkinson, "Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organ-
izations," 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68: Broadest of the Federal Criminal Statutes, 69 J. CRIM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 1, 1 (1978). RICO has withstood several constitutional challenges to its va-
lidity. See, e.g., United States v. Aleman, 609 F.2d 298, 305 & n.12 (7th Cir. 1979) (RICO
held not unconstitutionally vague), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 946 (1980); United States v. Cap-
petto, 502 F.2d 1351, 1355-56 (7th Cir. 1974) (RICO held not unconstitutionally vague and
within Congress' commerce power), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 925 (1975); see also United States
v. Frumento, 563 F.2d 1083, 1088-89 (3d Cir. 1977) (RICO does not expand dual sovereignty
doctrine), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1072 (1978); United States v. Castellano, 416 F. Supp. 125,
131 (E.D.N.Y. 1975) (RICO held within scope of Congress' power under commerce clause).
3 18 U.S.C. § 1982 (1982).
4 Id. § 1964(c). In addition to treble damages, a plaintiff may recover reasonable attor-
ney's fees. The treble damage and attorney's fee provisions of RICO were modeled after
similar provisions in the antitrust laws. See 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1982). In the antitrust context,
the private right of action for treble damages has been said to encourage plaintiffs to act
"gas private attorneys general' in protecting the public interest." Data Digests, Inc. v. Stan-
dard & Poor's Corp., 57 F.R.D. 42, 44 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (quoting Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v.
International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 147 (1968) (Fortas, J., concurring)).
5 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (1982); see infra notes 6-10 and accompanying text.
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commission of any two predicate violations enumerated in the stat-
ute within a 10-year period.6 Among the predicate offenses trigger-
ing the statute are mail fraud, wire fraud,' and "fraud in the sale
of securities."9 An enterprise can be any individual, legal entity, or
group associated in fact that affects interstate commerce.10 Section
6 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (1982). One of the predicate acts must have occurred after the
effective date of RICO, which was October 15, 1970. Id. Any period of imprisonment is
excluded when computing the 10-year period. Id. Section 1961(1) enumerates the predicate
acts that constitute racketeering activity. Id. § 1961(1). Included are any state law felonies
involving murder, kidnapping, gambling, arson, robbery, bribery, extortion, or dealing in
dangerous drugs. Id. § 1961(1)(A). Over 20 federal crimes under title 18 and title 29 of the
United States Code are listed. Id. § 1961(1)(B), (C). Bankruptcy fraud and felonies under
the drug laws are also included. Id. § 1961(1)(D). Congress intended to include those of-
fenses that are characteristically committed by organized criminals. See McClellan, The Or-
ganized Crime Act (S. 30) or its Critics: Which Threatens Civil Liberties?, 46 NoRE DAsm
LAW. 55, 142-43 (1970); infra note 35 and accompanying text.
There is some dispute concerning the degree of relationship necessary to establish a
pattern of racketeering activity. It is clear, however, that Congress did not intend to target
sporadic criminal acts. S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 158 (1969). The Senate Report
states:
The concept of "pattern" is essential to the operation of the statute. One iso-
lated "racketeering activity" was thought insufficient to trigger the remedies pro-
vided under the proposed chapter, largely because the net would be too large and
the remedies disproportionate to the gravity of the offense. The target of title IX
is thus not sporadic activity. The infiltration of legitimate business normally re-
quires more than one "racketeering activity" and the threat of continuing activity
to be effective. It is this factor of continuity plus relationship which combines to
produce a pattern.
Id. Some courts, therefore, hold that the racketeering acts must be interrelated by more
than simply having a common perpetrator. See, e.g., United States v. Stofsky, 409 F. Supp.
609, 613 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (requiring common scheme or plan), aff'd, 527 F.2d 237 (2d Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 819 (1976); see also United States v. White, 386 F. Supp. 882,
883-84 (E.D. Wis. 1974) (interrelatedness must be proved beyond reasonable doubt). The
majority view, on the other hand, requires only that the racketeering acts be related to the
affairs of the enterprise, not to each other. See, e.g., United States v. Elliott, 571 F.2d 880,
899 & n.23 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 953 (1978); United States v. Thevis, 474 F.
Supp. 134, 139 n.7 (N.D. Ga. 1979), af'd, 665 F.2d 616 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 57
(1982); see also United States v. DePalma, 461 F. Supp. 778, 782-83 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (legis-
lative focus was on enterprise, not only on persons committing the acts).
7 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1982); see infra notes 141-48 and accompanying text.
s 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (1982); see infra note 141 and accompanying text.
18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(D) (1982); see infra text accompanying note 94.
'0 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (1982). Enterprise is defined in section 1961(4) as:
any individual, partnership, corporation, association, or other legal entity, and any
union or group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity ....
Id. This definition is broad on its face and has been interpreted broadly by the courts. See,
e.g., Gunther v. Dinger, 547 F. Supp. 25, 27 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (decedent's estate is an enter-
prise); United States v. Vignola, 464 F. Supp. 1091, 1096 (E.D. Pa.) (traffic court is an enter-
prise), aff'd, 605 F.2d 1199 (3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1072 (1980). An enterprise
may consist of only one person. United States v. Joseph, 526 F. Supp. 504, 507 (E.D. Pa.
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1962 prohibits the investment of funds acquired from a pattern of
racketeering activity in an enterprise,11 the acquisition or mainte-
nance of an interest in, or control of, an enterprise through a pat-
tern of racketeering activity,12 and the conduct or participation in
1981); United States v. Hawkins, 516 F. Supp. 1204, 1206 (M.D. Ga. 1981); see Atkinson,
supra note 2, at 14-15.
For liability to attach under RICO, there must be some nexus between the enterprise
and the pattern of racketeering activity. Bennett v. Berg, 685 F.2d 1053, 1060 (8th Cir.
1982); United States v. Scotto, 641 F.2d 47, 54 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 961
(1981). This nexus is established if the defendant is able "to commit the predicate offenses
solely by virtue of his position in the enterprise or involvement in or control over the affairs
of the enterprise, or ... the predicate offenses are related to the activities of that enter-
prise." 641 F.2d at 54. However, the enterprise must have a distinct existence apart from the
pattern of racketeering activity. United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 583 (1981). The
existence of the enterprise, therefore, is a separate and essential element which must be
proved. Id.
The enterprise can be a legitimate organization or an illegitimate entity, such as a drug
or gambling ring, whose purpose and functions are totally criminal. See id. at 587; United
States v. Aleman, 609 F.2d 298, 303-04 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 946 (1980). In
addition, the enterprise, rather than the pattern of racketeering activities, must affect inter-
state commerce. United States v. Vignola, 464 F. Supp. at 1097; see also United States v.
Fineman, 434 F. Supp. 189, 195 (E.D. Pa. 1977); United States v. Frumento, 426 F. Supp.
797, 802-03 & n.6 (E.D. Pa. 1976), affd, 563 F.2d 1083 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied sub nom.
434 U.S. 1072 (1978). For commentaries advocating a conservative approach to the enter-
prise element, see Note, The Enterprise Element in RICO: A Proposed Interpretation, 49
GEo. WASH. L. Rv. 123, 139-42 (1980) (advocating a mens rea standard in proving enter-
prise element); Comment, supra note 2, at 104-25.
11 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) (1982). Section 1962(a) provides, in pertinent part:
It shall be unlawful for any person who has received any income derived, directly
or indirectly, from a pattern of racketeering activity or through collection of un-
lawful debt in which such person has participated as a principal within the mean-
ing of section 2, title 18, United States Code, to use or invest, directly or indi-
rectly, any part of such income, or the proceeds of such income, in acquisition of
any interest in, or the establishment or operation of, any enterprise which is en-
gaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce.
Id. Section 1962(a) excepts securities purchases made in the open market for the purpose of
investment only, if the aggregate purchases of the defendant and his family and associates
amount to less than one percent of the securities of any one class and do not confer the
power to elect any directors. Id. Some courts have interpreted section 1962(a) liberally,
holding that the funds acquired through the pattern of racketeering activity only need to
have "allowed or facilitated" the defendant's investment. See United States v. McNary, 620
F.2d 621, 628-29 (7th Cir. 1980); Spencer Cos. v. Agency Rent-A-Car, Inc., 1981-1982 Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 98,361, at 92,215-16 (D. Mass. 1981). See generally Note, Investing
Dirty Money: Section 1962(a) of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, 83 YALE L.J.
1491, 1491-94 (1974). Enforcement of section 1962(a) has proven difficult, however, because
of the problems inherent in tracing funds. See id. at 1492-94.
22 18 U.S.C. § 1962(b) (1982). Section 1962(b) states:
It shall be unlawful for any person through a pattern of racketeering activity or
through collection of an unlawful debt to acquire or maintain, directly or indi-
rectly, any interest in or control of any enterprise which is engaged in, or the
activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce.
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the affairs of an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activ-
ity.13 RICO, then, provides enhanced criminal and civil penalties
and remedies' for violations of existing law when such violations
combine to form a pattern of racketeering activity in connection
with an enterprise.' 5
Although the purpose of RICO is to eradicate organized crime
by attacking its financial base and deterring its infiltration into le-
gitimate businesses,'6 an increasing number of resourceful plain-
IS Id. § 1962(c). Section 1962(c) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any enter-
prise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce,
to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's
affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity or collection of unlawful debt.
Id. In addition, subsection (d) makes it unlawful to conspire to violate subsections (a), (b),
or (c). Id. § 1962(d). Subsection (c) is the most commonly used basis for civil RICO claims
because the statutory language, "conduct or participate," lends itself most easily to an ac-
tion based on direct damages for the predicate acts. See Long, Treble Damages for Viola-
tions of the Federal Securities Laws: A Suggested Analysis and Application of the RICO
Civil Cause of Action, 85 DICK. L. Rzv. 201, 231 (1981).
14 See Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922, 923
(Statement of Findings and Purpose). The enhanced criminal penalties for a violation of
section 1962 are maximum fines of $25,000, imprisonment for a maximum of 20 years, and
forfeiture of any interests or rights acquired or maintained through a pattern of racketeering
activity. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a) (1982). In addition to the criminal penalties and the private
treble damages actions, RICO permits the Attorney General to institute civil proceedings
against violators. Id. § 1964(b). The possible civil remedies include divestiture, permanent
or temporary injunctions against violators, and dissolution or reorganization of the enter-
prise. Id. § 1964(d). A criminal conviction under RICO will estop a defendant from denying
the allegations in a later civil action brought by the Attorney General. Id. A criminal convic-
tion also may be given collateral estoppel effect in a suit brought by a private plaintiff. See
Municipality of Anchorage v. Hitachi Cable, Ltd., 547 F. Supp. 633, 644 (D. Ala. 1982);
Anderson v. Janovich, 543 F. Supp. 1124, 1128-29 (W.D. Wash. 1982); State Farm Fire &
Casualty Co. v. Estate of Caton, 540 F. Supp. 673, 682-83 (N.D. Ind. 1982). For a discussion
of the availability of private equitable relief under RICO, see infra note 129 and accompa-
nying text.
'5 See United States v. Cauble, 706 F.2d 1322, 1330 (5th Cir. 1983); Salisbury v. Chap-
man, 527 F. Supp. 577, 579 (N.D. Ill. 1981). It has been said that RICO "does not make
criminal conduct that before its enactment was not already prohibited, since its application
depends on the existence of 'racketeering activity' that violates an independent criminal
statute." Blakey & Gettings, Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO): Ba-
sic Concepts-Criminal and Civil Remedies, 53 TaMP. L.Q. 1009, 1021 n.71 (1980); see At-
kinson, supra note 2, at 1.
'0 See, e.g., Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922, 923
(Statement of Findings and Purpose); 116 CONG. REc. 602 (1970) (remarks of Sen. Hruska);
116 CONG. REc. 591 (1970) (remarks of Sen. McClellan); see also 116 CONG. Rc. 603 (1970)
(remarks of Sen. Yarborough) ("[RICO] is designed to root out the influence of organized
crime on legitimate business"); United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 591 (1981). The
Turkette Court stated that "the major purpose of Title IX is to address the infiltration of
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tiffs have taken advantage of its civil damage provisions to attack
defendants whose activities seem far removed from any traditional
notions of organized crime.17 These actions have occasioned a great
deal of controversy in the courts and among commentators, 18 since
the apparently unlimited sweep of the statutory language presents
a potential for federalizing state common-law fraud claims and
radically disrupting existing securities law.19 Consequently, judi-
cially created restrictions have been developed to circumscribe the
scope of the RICO cause of action. Courts have focused on the
character of the defendant20 as well as on the nature of the injury2
in an attempt to limit the reach of the Act. The majority of courts,
however, have adopted a broad approach. 22 Refusing to superim-
pose restrictive judicial glosses onto the plain language of the stat-
ute, these courts have allowed plaintiffs to state a RICO cause of
action based on allegations of damages inflicted by two or more
predicate acts.23
This Note will attempt to provide a framework whereby the
potentially limitless scope of section 1964(c) is confined to those
situations contemplated by Congress while retaining the statute's
legitimate business by organized crime. The point is made time and again during the de-
bates and in the hearings before the House and Senate." 452 U.S. at 576.
17 See, e.g., Congregation Beth Yitzhok v. Briskman, 566 F. Supp. 555, 557 (E.D.N.Y.
1983) (suit concerning control of a Chassidic congregation); Kaushal v. State Bank of India,
556 F. Supp. 576, 578 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (Indian bank); Moss v. Morgan Stanley Inc., 553 F.
Supp. 1347, 1359 (S.D.N.Y.) (investment banking house), affd on other grounds, 719 F.2d 5
(2d Cir. 1983); Mauriber v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 546 F. Supp. 391, 396
(S.D.N.Y. 1982) (brokerage firm); Van Schaick v. Church of Scientology, 535 F. Supp. 1125,
1135 (D. Mass. 1982) (church).
2S See, e.g., Blakey, The RICO Civil Fraud Action in Context: Reflections on Bennett
v. Berg, 58 NoRE DA.m LAw. 237, 280-83 (1982); Blakey & Gettings, supra note 15, at 1040-
43; Long, supra note 13, at 209; Pickholz & Friedman, Civil RICO Action, 14 REv. SEC. REG.
965, 965 (1981); Strafer, Massumi & Skolnick, Civil RICO in the Public Interest: "Every-
body's Darling," 19 AM. CAnM. L. REv. 655, 685-709 (1982); Tarlow, RICO Revisited, 17 GA.
L. R.v. 291, 303-05 (1983); Note, Civil RICO: The Temptation and Impropriety of Judicial
Restriction, 95 HARv. L. REv. 1101, 1115-18 (1982); Comment, supra note 2, at 125-30; Com-
ment, Civil RICO Actions in Commercial Litigation: Racketeer or Businessman?, 36 Sw.
L.J. 925, 938-50 (1982).
'9 See infra notes 97-116, 122-29 & 140-51 and accompanying text.
"0 See infra notes 41-57 and accompanying text.
s See infra notes 58-92 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 23, 98 & 141 and accompanying text.
23 See, e.g., Schacht v. Brown, 711 F.2d 1343, 1351, 1361 (7th Cir. 1983); Kimmel v.
Peterson, 565 F. Supp. 476, 490-91 (E.D. Pa. 1983); Meineke Discount Muffler Shops, Inc. v.
Note, 548 F. Supp. 352, 354 (E.D.N.Y. 1982); Parnes v. Heinold Commodities, Inc., 487 F.
Supp. 645, 646 (N.D. Ill. 1980); Farmers Bank v. Bell Mortgage Corp., 452 F. Supp. 1278,
1280 (D. Del. 1978).
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character as a valuable means of deterrence to, and redress for vic-
tims of, organized crime. At the outset, this Note will present a
brief review of the legislative history and purpose of RICO. The
Note then will examine the various judicial and academic ap-
proaches to evaluating a RICO claim. The latter part of the Note
will suggest a limitation on RICO actions predicated on allegations
of securities fraud, including the use of RICO in the context of a
tender offer. A similar analysis is used to suggest a restriction on
civil RICO complaints predicated on mail or wire fraud.
BACKGROUND
RICO was enacted as Title IX of the Organized Crime Control
Act of 1970 (the Act).24 The purpose of the Act was to seek to
eradicate the growing influence of organized crime in American so-
ciety.25 Of particular concern was the infiltration of legitimate bus-
iness by organized crime.26 Congress had found that existing law
enforcement methods and sanctions had proven inadequate in con-
trolling the growth and economic power of this particular criminal
24 Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 901(a), 84 Stat. 922 (1970) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 18 and 28 U.S.C.). The Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 (the Act) was en-
acted as a comprehensive attack on what was considered a worsening problem. 84 Stat. at
923. The Act contains 12 separate titles, each designed to remedy specific, although often
overlapping, problem areas. See id. at 922-62.
26 See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
20 See S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 76-77 (1969); 116 CONG. REC. 591 (1970)
(remarks of Sen. McClellan) ("title IX is aimed at removing organized crime from our legiti-
mate organizations"); 116 CONG. REc. 602 (remarks of Sen. Hruska) (RICO is designed to
remove the influence of organized crime from legitimate business); 116 CONG. REc. 607 (re-
marks of Sen. Byrd) ("[r]ecent studies of... organized crime ... have identified its alarm-
ing expansion into the field of legitimate business as a major threat to our institutions"); 116
CONG. REC. 953 (remarks of Sen. Thurmond) ("[t]his legislation provides an effective way to
destroy [organized crime's] legitimate business fronts").
Congress had been concerned with the infiltration of legitimate organizations by organ-
ized crime since the early 1950's. The Special Committee to Investigate Organized Crime in
Interstate Commerce (the Kefauver Committee) found that "[one of the most perplexing
problems in the field of organized crime is presented by the fact that criminals and racke-
teers are using the profits of organized crime to buy up and operate legitimate business
enterprises." S. REP. No. 141, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 33 (1951). Thereafter, Congress made a
number of attempts to focus on the problem. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 72, 89th Cong., 1st Sess.
1 (1965) (confronting problem of a national criminal syndicate); S. REP. No. 1784, 87th
Cong., 2d Sess. 1-40 (1962) (influence of organized crime on labor); S. REP. No. 621, 86th
Cong., 1st Sess. at v (1960) (labor); S. REP. No. 1417, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1958) (labor).
In 1967, the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice
suggested the possibility of civil remedies similar to those existing under the antitrust laws
for use against organized crime infiltration. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAw ENFORCEMENT AND
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRaME IN A FREE SocIETY 208 (1967).
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element.27 Indeed, principals in organized crime had demonstrated
an uncanny ability to avoid conviction and punishment under ex-
isting state and federal laws.28 Congress hoped, therefore, to estab-
lish a comprehensive system of additional penalties and remedies
to aid in the eradication of organized crime.2 9 Essential to this pur-
pose were enhanced methods of eroding the financial foundation of
organized crime.3 0 Drawing on one of the most effective tools of
antitrust enforcement, the House of Representatives added to the
original Senate bill a provision for a private right of action for
treble damages and attorney's fees.31 An award of treble damages
27 Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922, 923 (State-
ment of Findings and Purpose). Congress found that
[O]rganized crime continues to grow because of defects in the evidence-gathering
process of the law inhibiting the development of the legally admissible evidence
necessary to bring criminal and other sanctions or remedies to bear on the unlaw-
ful activities of those engaged in organized crime and because the sanctions and
remedies available to the Government are unnecessarily limited in scope and
impact.
Id.; S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 78 (1969) ("our present laws are inadequate to
remove criminal influences from legitimate endeavor organizations"); see United States v.
Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 586 (1981).
28 See S. RaP. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 78 (1969). The Senate Report stated that
"not a single one of the 'families' of La Cosa Nostra has been destroyed through criminal
prosecutions." Id.
9 See Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922, 923
(Statement of Findings and Purpose). The purpose clause states:
It is the purpose of this Act to seek the eradication of organized crime in the
United States by strengthening the legal tools in the evidence-gathering process,
by establishing new penal prohibitions, and by providing enhanced sanctions and
new remedies to deal with the unlawful activities of those engaged in organized
crime.
Id.
30 See, e.g., S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 79 (1969). The Senate Report de-
scribed Congress' goal in enacting RICO: "What is needed ... are new approaches that will
deal not only with individuals, but also with the economic base. ... In short, an attack
must be made on their source of economic power itself, and the attack must take place on
all available fronts." Id.; 116 CONG. Rac. 35,193 (1970) (remarks of Rep. Poff).
31 H.R. REP. No. 1549, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 18, reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. &
A. NEws 4007, 4010. The original Senate version of RICO did not contain a provision for a
private right of action. See S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 24 (1969). The predecessor
to RICO, S. 2048, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 113 CONG. REc. 18,007 (1967), which prohibited the
business or investment use of unreported income, was proposed as an amendment to the
Sherman Act in an effort to bring antitrust remedies to bear on organized crime. See id.; 113
CONG. REc. 17,999 (1967) (remarks of Sen. Hruska); see also S. 2049, 90th Cong., 1st Sess.,
113 CONG. REC. 18,007 (1967) (providing for, inter alia, private rights of action for treble
damages and equitable relief); H.R. 11,268, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 113 CONG. REc. 17,976
(1967); H.R. 11,266, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 113 CONG. REc. 17,976 (1967). After studying the
bills, the Antitrust Section of the American Bar Association agreed with the basic principles
embodied in the bills but recommended that the proposals be included in a separate statute,
1983]
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and attorney's fees, it was believed, would strike a more forceful
blow against organized crime's economic interests and would serve
to offset the presumed dangers involved in suing "the syndicate. 32
A more controversial issue debated during the legislative con-
sideration of RICO was defining the concept of organized crime. 3s
A narrow, specific definition of organized crime was rejected in
favor of a behavior-oriented scheme predicated on the commission
of proscribed offenses in connection with an enterprise. 34 In formu-
rather than grafted onto the antitrust laws. See Organized Crime Control: Hearings on S.
30 Before the Subcomm. No. 5, House Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 149
(1970) [hereinafter cited as House Hearings]. Since the objectives of the two areas of law
were different, the Antitrust Section reasoned, the victim of organized crime should not be
subjected to the restrictions of established antitrust doctrine in areas such as standing and
causation. See id.; see also infra notes 81-86 and accompanying text.
.. See Note, supra note 18, at 1113 n.66; cf. Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat,
Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 486 n.10 (1977). The treble damage provisions of the Clayton Act "were
conceived primarily as 'open[ing] the door of justice to every man, whenever he may be
injured by those who violate the antitrust laws, and giv[ing] the injured party ample dam-
ages for the wrong suffered.'" 429 U.S. at 486 n.10. (quoting 51 CONG. REc. 9073 (1914)
(remarks of Rep. Webb)); see also Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S.
100, 130-31 (1969) (purpose of giving private parties treble damages was not merely to pro-
vide private relief, but also to enforce the antitrust laws).
33 See, e.g., Hearings on S. 30 and Other Measures Relating to Organized Crime
Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Laws and Procedures of the Comm. on the Judiciary,
91st Cong., 1st Sess. 475 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Senate Hearings] (statement of Ameri-
can Civil Liberties Union criticizing broad sweep of RICO); H.R. REP. No. 1549, 91st Cong.,
2d Sess. 187 (dissenting views of Reps. Conyers, Mikva, and Ryan), reprinted in 1970 U.S.
CODE CONG. & A. NEws 4007, 4082. The dissenting Congressmen raised the spectre of dis-
gruntled competitors attacking businessmen who happen to have won over $1,000 in various
poker games as an example of the overbreadth of the statute. H.R. REP. No. 1549, 91st
Cong., 2d Sess. 187, reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & An. NEWS 4007, 4082; see also
House Hearings, supra note 31, at 472 (statement of Rep. Koch) (expressing concern over
vagueness and breadth of proposal).
4 116 CONG. REC. 35,343-46 (1970). Representative Biaggi had proposed an amendment
which provided, in part:
"Mafia and La Cosa Nostra Organizations" mean nationally organized crimi-
nal groups composed of persons of Italian ancestry forming an underworld govern-
ment ruled by a form of board of directors, who direct or conduct a pattern of
racketeering activity and control the national operation of a criminal enterprise in
furtherance of a monopolistic trade restraining criminal conspiracy.
It shall be unlawful for any person to be a member of a Mafia or a La Cosa
Nostra organization.
Id. at 35,343. The Biaggi proposal was attacked on several grounds. First, the definition was
impractical and vague. Id. at 35,343-44 (remarks of Rep. Celler). Second, it was unfair to
single out "persons of Italian ancestry." Id. at 35,344 (remarks of Rep. Poff); id. at 35,345
(remarks of Rep. Moss). Third, the amendment might create an unconstitutional status of-
fense. Id. at 35,344 (remarks of Rep. Poff). Fourth, too narrow a definition of organized
crime would unduly restrict law enforcement efforts against organized crime. Id. (remarks of
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lating the roster of proscribed acts, the drafters attempted to in-
clude those offenses that lend themselves to "organized commercial
exploitation," and are characteristically committed by participants
in organized crime."s The breadth of the proposed statutory
scheme was acknowledged but accepted as the only effective means
of reaching organized crime. 6 Clearly, Congress recognized that
RICO would envelop more than traditional organized crime fig-
ures.3 7 Indeed, Congress included an explicit directive that RICO
Rep. Poff). Most of these same criticisms also have been leveled against the judicially im-
posed requirement of a nexus to organized crime. See infra notes 51-57 and accompanying
text.
,, McClellan, supra note 6, at 142-43. Non-commercial offenses such as rape were not
included in section 1961(1), id., because "the purpose of Title IX is economic, [and] it would
be pointless surplusage for it to cover crimes which are not adapted to commercial exploita-
tion," id. at 161-62. Congressman Poff explained the reasoning behind the structure of the
statutes: "[Organized crime] is a functional or sociological concept like white-collar crime or
street crime, serving simply as a shorthand method of referring to a large and varying group
of individual criminal offenses committed in diverse circumstances." 116 CONG. REc. 35,344
(1970) (statement of Rep. Poff); see id. at 18,913-14 (remarks of Sen. McClellan).
36 See, e.g., Wilson, The Threat of Organized Crime: Highlighting the Challenging
New Frontiers in Criminal Law, 46 NoTRE DAME LAw. 41, 48 (1970). Assistant Attorney
General Wilson noted that "[s]eldom, if ever, would one expect to be able to draft an ac-
ceptable provision which would apply exclusively to the Syndicate. Certainly no provision in
S. 30 purports to be so narrowly limited." Id. (emphasis in original); accord House Hearings,
supra note 31, at 185-86 (statement of Att'y Gen. Mitchell). Attorney General Mitchell,
referring to title X, which deals with special offender sentencing, described the difficulties of
delineating organized crime: "We have provisions which do not relate solely to organized
crimes .... [T]he categories of 'general crime' and 'organized crime' frequently over-
lap.. . The criminal activities of those engaged in organized crime do not always fall into
neat categories." House Hearings, supra note 31, at 185-86 (statement of Att'y Gen.
Mitchell).
It might be suggested that Congress was implicitly relying on prosecutorial discretion in
enacting such a broad statute. See 116 CONG. REc. 35,302 (1970) (remarks of Rep. Celler).
Representative Celler, one of the House sponsors, replying to a question about a definition
of organized crime, stated: "That particular matter was left flexible so that there would be
no difficulty in enabling the Attorney General to attack this very horrendous evil that besets
our Nation." Id. This would seem to indicate that Congress wanted to provide a broad
framework within which the Attorney General could attack serious violators. See United
States v. Anderson, 626 F.2d 1358, 1369 (8th Cir. 1980) (Congress did not intend for prose-
cutors to use RICO to prosecute minor offenses), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 912 (1981); United
States v. Huber, 603 F.2d 387, 395-96 (2d Cir. 1979) (advocating prosecutorial restraint),
cert. denied, 445 U.S. 927 (1980). No element of prosecutorial discretion exists, of course, in
civil actions in which the plaintiff senses a large recovery.
37 See United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 593 (1981); United States v. Thordar-
son, 646 F.2d 1323, 1328 n.10 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1055 (1981); United States v.
Campanale, 518 F.2d 352, 363-64 (9th Cir. 1975); McClellan, supra note 6, at 142; see also
Note, supra note 18, at 1109 (Congress "chose to risk the imposition of liability on defen-
dants not tied to organized crime in order to cast a sufficiently wide net").
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"shall be liberally construed to effectuate its remedial purpose.""
While it is apparent that Congress intended a broad reach for
RICO, there is no indication in the legislative history that Con-
gress intended to alter the securities laws in any fundamental
way.39 Nor is there any hint that Congress, contrary to well-estab-
lished case law, intended to provide a private right of action in the
federal courts for violations of the mail or wire fraud statutes.40
The courts are placed, therefore, in the position of attempting to
effectuate congressional intent without disregarding the plain lan-
guage of the statute.
JUDICIAL RESTRICTIONS ON THE SCOPE OF CIViL RICO
The Requirement of a Connection to Organized Crime
The first judicially imposed restriction on the wide ambit of
civil RICO was promulgated in Barr v. WUIITAS, Inc.,41 wherein
the District Court for the Southern District of New York held that
the defendant must be connected in some way to organized crime
for a plaintiff to state a claim under RICO.42 The plaintiffs in Barr
alleged, inter alia, that the defendant, the largest telephone an-
swering service in the United States,4 s had engaged in a pattern of
Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 904(a), 84 Stat. 922, 947.
No other federal criminal statute contains a liberal construction clause. See Note, RICO and
the Liberal Construction Clause, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 167, 168 & n.6, 184-90 (1980). This
liberal construction directive runs counter to the maxim that criminal statutes are to be
construed strictly. See, e.g., Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S. 808, 812 (1971) ("ambiguity
concerning the ambit of criminal statutes should be resolved in favor of lenity"); Bell v.
United States, 349 U.S. 81, 84 (1955). At least one court has held that liberal construction
applies only to the civil provisions of RICO, not to the criminal penalties. See United States
v. Mandel, 415 F. Supp. 997, 1022 (D. Md. 1976), aff'd in part, vacated and remanded in
part, 591 F.2d 1347 (4th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 961 (1980).
89 See Dan River, Inc. v. Icahn, 701 F.2d 278, 291 (4th Cir. 1983) (dictum) ("Congress
was out to attack the problem of organized crime, not the problems of corporate control and
risk arbitrage"); Hokama v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 566 F. Supp. 636, 643 (C.D. Cal. 1983);
Johnsen v. Rogers, 551 F. Supp. 281, 284-85 (C.D. Cal. 1982); Adair v. Hunt Int'l Resources
Corp., 526 F. Supp. 736, 747 (N.D. IlM. 1981). The Adair court found that "[tihere simply is
no hint in the congressional proceedings that the Act was viewed as an alternative, and
cumulative, remedy for private plaintiffs alleging securities fraud ... " 526 F. Supp. at
747.
40 See, e.g., Moss v. Morgan Stanley Inc., 553 F. Supp. 1347, 1361 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd on
other grounds, 719 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1983). The Moss court found not "a single mention of
such a revolutionary consequence anywhere in the legislative history." Id.
41 66 F.R.D. 109 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
42 Id. at 113.
43 Id.
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racketeering activity by mailing fraudulent bills to its subscrib-
ers.44 The Barr court refused to allow the plaintiffs to include a
RICO claim because the defendant was not alleged to be a member
of "a society of criminals operating outside of the law.' 45 After ex-
amining the legislative history of RICO, the court concluded that
the Act was not intended to be applied to "perfectly legitimate"
businesses.4'6 The court then noted the pejorative element of al-
lowing a "racketeering" claim against a legitimate business, a fac-
tor which continues to influence courts and attorneys considering
RICO claims.47 The court provided little guidance as to how organ-
ized crime might be defined or proved.'8
This approach has found some support among certain district
courts,' 9 although it has been rejected by every circuit court that
44 Id. at 112. The plaintiffs claimed that the defendant fraudulently increased the num-
ber of message units billed to subscribers by at least 20% on each subscriber's monthly bill.
Id. The original complaint alleged that arbitrary price increases amounted to violations of
the Sherman Antitrust Act and various Executive orders and price controls. Id. Subsequent
to the filing of the action, the plaintiffs sought leave to amend the complaint pursuant to
rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to include the RICO claim. Id.
45 Id. at 113. The court made no effort to reconcile its decision with the actual language
of the statute, admitting that, "[w]hen read literally," RICO seemed to encompass the facts
alleged. Id. at 112. Instead, the court based its decision solely on the legislative history. Id.
at 113.
" Id. at 113. The court's rather cursory and selective discussion of the legislative his-
tory focused on the frequent references to "racketeers," "organized crime," "syndicate,"
"Mafia," and "Cosa Nostra," and concluded that these groups were the sole objects of the
legislation. Id. Somewhat ironically, the court stated, "the most that can be said is that
defendant's transactions, on this occasion, have been illegal." Id.
47 Id. The Barr court believed that it would be "patently unfair" to allow the plaintiff
to file a RICO claim because such an allegation "would add credence to an inference that
defendant is somehow involved in organized crime." Id.; see Moss v. Morgan Stanley Inc.,
553 F. Supp. 1347, 1359 (S.D.N.Y.) ("such a charge infects the fundamental fairness of civil
litigation"), aff'd, 719 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1983); Lewin, Racketeering Law's Fallout, N.Y. Times,
June 27, 1983, at D1, col. 1 (RICO charge carries "emotional ... wallop"); see also H.R.
REP. No. 1549, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 187 (dissenting views of Reps. Conyers, Mikva and
Ryan), reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4007, 4083. "What a protracted,
expensive trial may not succeed in doing, the adverse publicity may well accom-
plish--destruction of the rival's business." Id. But cf. Note, supra note 18, at 1107 (stigma
of RICO claim attaches only if applied solely to proven organized crime figures).
48See 66 F.R.D. at 113. Although the court repeatedly alluded to membership in "a
society of criminals" as a requisite for a cause of action, the court failed to expound on what
conduct would be necessary to constitute "organized crime." Id.
" See, e.g., Hokama v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 566 F. Supp. 636, 643-44 (C.D. Cal. 1983);
Minpeco, S.A. v. Conticommodity Servs., Inc., 558 F. Supp. 1348, 1351 (S.D.N.Y. 1983);
Wagner v. Bear, Stearns & Co., 1982-1983 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) S 99,032, at 94,913 (N.D.
Ill. 1982); Waterman S.S. Corp. v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc., 527 F. Supp. 256, 260 (E.D. La.
1981); Adair v. Hunt Int'l Resources Corp., 526 F. Supp. 736, 747 (N.D. Ill. 1981).
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has directly considered it50 and is subject to attack on several
grounds. First, there is nothing in the language of the statute that
requires a connection with organized crime.51 Indeed, Congress re-
jected such an approach in favor of a statute based on the commis-
sion of enumerated criminal acts in connection with an enter-
prise.2 Congress, wary of possible constitutional difficulties, did
not intend to create a status offense. Moreover, the concept of
organized crime is vague and difficult to define."4 Even more diffi-
cult is proving such an allegation.5 5 Requiring proof of an involve-
80 See, e.g., Schacht v. Brown, 711 F.2d 1343, 1353-56 (7th Cir. 1983) (organized crime
theory is "already discredited"); see Moss v. Morgan Stanley Inc., 719 F.2d 5, 21 (2d Cir.
1983); Bennett v. Berg, 685 F.2d 1053, 1063-64 (8th Cir. 1982), affd on rehearing, 710 F.2d
1361 (8th Cir. 1983) (en banc).
52 See, e.g., D'Iorio v. Adonizio, 554 F. Supp. 222, 230 (M.D. Pa. 1982) ("requiring a
nexus with organized crime.. . would be attempting to further Congress' legislative intent
by ignoring its legislative language"); Heinold Commodities, Inc. v. McCarty, 513 F. Supp.
311, 313 (N.D. Ill. 1979); United States v. Chovanec, 467 F. Supp. 41, 45 (S.D.N.Y. 1979);
Blakey & Gettings, supra note 15, at 1031-33; Note, supra note 18, at 1106-09; Comment,
supra note 2, at 101 n.4. The phrase "organized crime" does not appear in the text of title
IX. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1982).
11 See supra notes 33-38 and accompanying text.
53 See 116 CONG. REc. 35,344 (1970) (remarks of Rep. Poff); see also Haber v. Kobrin,
1982-1983 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 99,259, at 96,163-64 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); cf. Robinson v.
California, 370 U.S. 660, 666-67 (1962) (punishment solely for status as drug addict held
unconstitutional); Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 457-58 (1939) (penal statute out-
lawing "gang" membership struck down for vagueness). In Scales v. United States, 367 U.S.
203 (1961), the Supreme Court explained the standard for status or "membership" crimes:
In our jurisprudence guilt is personal, and when the imposition of punishment
on a status or on conduct can only be justified by reference to the relationship of
that status or conduct to other concededly criminal activity (here advocacy of vio-
lent overthrow), that relationship must be sufficiently substantial to satisfy the
concept of personal guilt in order to withstand attack under the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
Id. at 224-25. Thus, to be subject to criminal penalties, the defendant must in some way
actively support a criminal endeavor or objective. See id. at 222.
" See, e.g., Kimmel v. Peterson, 565 F. Supp. 476, 491 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (Congress recog-
nized that defining organized crime was "a difficult task which would be of dubious
benefit").
55 United States v. Roselli, 432 F.2d 879, 885 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 924
(1971); Haber v. Kobrin, 1982-1983 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 99,259, at 96,164 (S.D.N.Y.
1983); United States v. Chovanec, 467 F. Supp. 41, 44-45 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). In Roselli, the
Ninth Circuit stated:
It would usually be difficult, if not impossible, to prove that an individual or busi-
ness was associated with or controlled by a clandestine criminal organization....
[S]uch a restriction upon the statute's coverage would provide an easy avenue for
evasion through adoption of new forms and techniques of illicit trafficking.
432 F.2d at 885. Indeed, it was the difficulty inherent in proving organized crime ties that
spurred Congress to enact RICO. See Kimmel v. Peterson, 565 F. Supp. 476, 492 (E.D. Pa.
1983) ("RICO would probably not have been necessary in the first instance" had organized
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ment with organized crime would permit the targets of the legisla-
tion to circumvent sanctions under RICO as they had
circumvented previous attempts to constrain their activities.5 6 It is
suggested that judicial attempts to discern the presence of organ-
ized crime on a case-by-case basis, especially at the pleading stage,
could easily lead to inequitable and uneven results. Such a subjec-
tive approach would reward criminals sophisticated enough to
maintain a more polished appearance of legitimacy, precisely the
criminals whose corruption is most insidious to our institutions
and who were the original objects of this legislation. 57
Racketeering Enterprise Injury
Other courts attempting to delimit the broad scope of RICO
have imposed more sophisticated standing restrictions which may
be classified under the rubric "racketeering enterprise injury." The
first such restriction was articulated in North Barrington Develop-
ment, Inc. v. Fanslow,5 in which the District Court for the North-
ern District of Illinois held that a plaintiff must allege some type of
competitive injury to his business in order to state a claim under
RICO.5 The court reasoned that Congress' purpose was to prevent
interference with free competition by organized crime and to re-
duce crime's burden on interstate commerce. 0° Accordingly, the
North Barrington court held that one is only injured in his "busi-
ness or property" within the meaning of the statute if his business
is injured as a result of direct competition with a business engaged
in racketeering activity."1
The North Barrington theory was refined further in
crimes been readily susceptible to proof by private plaintiffs); Hanna Mining Co. v. Norcen
Energy Resources Ltd., 1982 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 98,742, at 93,736 (N.D. Ohio 1982);
supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text.
"See supra notes 27-28 & 55 and accompanying text.
8" See McClellan, supra note 6, at 142; Note, supra note 18, at 1109. Senator McClellan
noted that racketeers controlled national "industries with known and respected brand
names." McClellan, supra note 6, at 142. In addition, the syndicate was found to control a
national hotel chain and a large bank. Id. As one court has noted, any definition of organ-
ized crime would permit some RICO targets to "slip through the cracks because [they]
might not fit comfortably into some artificial definition ... ." Kimmel v. Peterson, 565 F.
Supp. 476, 492-93 (E.D. Pa. 1983); see Mauriber v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 546 F.
Supp. 391, 396 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
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Landmark Savings & Loan v. Rhoades,62 in which the District
Court for the Eastern District of Michigan refused to allow a plain-
tiff alleging securities fraud to amend his complaint to include a
RICO claim."3 The Landmark court took the North Barrington de-
cision a step further, holding that a plaintiff must have suffered a
"racketeering enterprise injury" to have standing to sue under
RICO. 4 Although the court asserted that a "racketeering enter-
prise injury" could differ from a competitive injury, little guidance
was provided as to the contours of this injury. 5 The court em-
ployed the similarity of section 1964(c) with section 4 of the Clay-
ton Act 6 to argue that standing under RICO, like standing under
the antitrust laws, should be limited to the distinctive injury that
RICO was designed to prevent, which is that type which could only
be inflicted by a racketeering enterprise.6 7
In Van Schaick v. Church of Scientology,6e the District Court
for the District of Massachusetts rejected a strict competitive in-
jury standard. Instead, the court held that in order to state a claim
under RICO, the plaintiff must allege that she suffered commercial
62 527 F. Supp. 206 (E.D. Mich. 1981).
1 Id. at 209. The securities counts in Landmark were based on allegations of fraud,
churning, and unsuitability. Id. at 207.
" Id. at 208.
'5 See id. at 208-09. The court noted that "[c]ompetitive injuries and racketeering en-
terprise injuries [c]ould frequently overlap." Id. As an example of a racketeering enterprise
injury, the court posited the situation in which the "defendant's ability to harm the plaintiff
is enhanced by the infusion of money from a pattern of racketeering activity into the enter-
prise." Id. at 209. In short, the injury must be "something more or different than injury
from predicate acts." Id. at 208; see infra note 73 and accompanying text; see also Cenco
Inc. v. Seidman & Seidman, 686 F.2d 449, 457 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 177 (1982).
In Cenco, the Seventh Circuit held that auditors who were subjected to civil liability for
failure to detect massive fraud by corporate managers had no standing to assert a RICO
claim against the corporation. 686 F.2d at 457. The court reasoned that civil RICO damages
were provided for the benefit of the owners, customers, and competitors of businesses infil-
trated by criminals, and not for the benefit of those used as "witting or unwitting tools" of
the offenders. Id.; see Alexander Grant & Co. v. Tiffany Indus., 563 F. Supp. 35, 36-37 (E.D.
Mo. 1982).
-815 U.S.C. § 15 (1982); see supra note 31 and accompanying text.
67 Landmark Say. & Loan v. Rhoades, 527 F. Supp. 206, 208 (E.D. Mich. 1981); see
Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977) ("Plaintiffs must
prove antitrust injury, which is to say injury of the type the antitrust laws were intended to
prevent and that flows from that which makes defendants' acts unlawful"); Chrysler Corp. v.
Fedders Corp., 643 F.2d 1229, 1235 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 893 (1981). The
Landmark court noted that "[tihe victims of predicate crimes almost always have a cause of
action for direct damages under federal or state law." 527 F. Supp. at 209. For an argument
in favor of the competitive injury standard, see Comment, supra note 2, at 125-32.
" 535 F. Supp. 1125 (D. Mass. 1982).
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injury.6 9 Thus, the court interpreted the phrase "injured in his
business or property" to restrict the plaintiff class to those injured
in their business activities.70 Since the plaintiff's allegations in Van
Schaick were in the nature of consumer fraud, the complaint was
dismissed for failure to state a claim.7 1
Other courts have employed similar theories of standing based
on a "racketeering enterprise injury" to exclude RICO plaintiffs.7 2
The common denominator in these opinions is the rationale that
Congress did not intend to provide a federal cause of action for
state law violations or to preempt the securities laws; thus, RICO
should provide a remedy only to those distinctively injured by a
racketeering enterprise. 3 Unfortunately, the cases do not make
clear how this distinction is to be drawn.7 4
It is submitted that these judicial glosses-the "racketeering
enterprise injury," "competitive injury," and "commercial injury"
1, Id. at 1137. Noting that the primary purpose of RICO was to protect legitimate busi-
nesses from infiltration by organized crime, the court stated that the judiciary "should be
sensitive to the statute's commercial orientation . . . ." Id.
70 Id.
71 Id. at 1138. In a vaguely worded complaint, the plaintiff claimed treble damages for
money and property which allegedly was turned over to the Church of Scientology as a
result of fraud. Id. at 1136. The action was brought as a class action on behalf of all those
similarly defrauded. Id. at 1135.
72 See, e.g., Barker v. Underwriters at Lloyd's, London, 564 F. Supp. 352, 358 (E.D.
Mich. 1983); see Bankers Trust Co. v. Feldesman, 566 F. Supp. 1235, 1240-41 (S.D.N.Y.
1983); Johnsen v. Rogers, 551 F. Supp. 281, 284-85 (C.D. Cal. 1982); Harper v. New Japan
Sec. Int'l, Inc., 545 F. Supp. 1002, 1006 (C.D. Cal. 1982). Some courts have emphasized that
the civil remedy in RICO provides damages only for injuries suffered "by reason of" a RICO
violation. See, e.g., Harper, 545 F. Supp. at 1007. To be compensable under RICO, it is
reasoned, injuries must have been suffered as a result of a distinctive RICO violation, not
simply a predicate act. See, e.g., Bankers Trust, 566 F. Supp. at 1240; Johnsen, 551 F.
Supp. at 284-85; Harper, 545 F. Supp. at 1007.
" See, e.g., Alton v. Alton, No. 82-0795 (S.D.N.Y. July 9, 1982) (available Nov. 19,
1983, on LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist. file); Van Schaick v. Church of Scientology, 535 F.
Supp. 1125, 1137 (D. Mass. 1982); North Barrington Dev., Inc. v. Fanslow, 547 F. Supp. 207,
210 (N.D. IM. 1980).
7' See, e.g., Barker v. Underwriters at Lloyd's, London, 564 F. Supp. 352, 358 (E.D.
Mich. 1983); Johnsen v. Rogers, 551 F. Supp. 281, 284-85 (C.D. Cal. 1982). The precise con-
tours of the nebulous "'something more' than the direct damages or 'distinctive' injury"
standard have eluded more than one court. See, e.g., Eisenberg v. Gagnon, 564 F. Supp.
1347, 1352-53 (E.D. Pa. 1983) ("it has not been made clear ... by... the cases ... what
that 'something more' would be"); Windsor Assocs. v. Greenfeld, 564 F. Supp. 273, 279 (D.
Md. 1983) (racketeering enterprise injury theory is "analytically indistinguishable" from or-
ganized crime theory); see Hokama v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 566 F. Supp. 636, 643 (C.D. Cal.
1983) (limitations of racketeering enterprise injury are "little more than indirect statements
of the first-mentioned requirement that plaintiffs demonstrate a 'nexus to organized
crime' ").
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standing requirements-are no more appropriate than the require-
ment of proving a tie to organized crime. If such standards are ap-
plied, the direct victims of the predicate offenses may be precluded
from recovery under RICO, since they may not be engaged in busi-
nesses that are in competition with racketeer influenced business."
An indirect victim of a pattern of racketeering activity is no more
distinctively injured by the pattern than is the direct victim.78 The
adoption of a standard that precludes direct victims from stating a
cause of action under RICO places a RICO plaintiff in a unique
position in the jurisprudence of causation in that the more indirect
his injury, the more likely he is to recover.77
Moreover, interpretation of the phrase "injured in his business
or property" to exclude consumer injuries is in contradiction to the
Supreme Court's holding in Reiter v. Sonotone Corp.,78 in which
the Court interpreted the same phrase in section 4 of the Clayton
Act to include consumer injury. 9 Indeed, there seems to be no
principled reason to read the disjunctive "or" out of the statute.80
7' See, e.g., Blakey, supra note 18, at 325-30. Professor Blakey and others have cor-
rectly noted that the direct victims of organized crime were clearly within the intended class
of beneficiaries under RICO. Id. at 348; see Strafer, Massumi & Skolnick, supra note 18, at
701-02; Note, supra note 18, at 1113-14.
7' See Crocker Nat'l Bank v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 555 F. Supp. 47, 49-50 (N.D. Cal.
1982). In Crocker, the defendants argued that the racketeering enterprise theory "does not
withstand analysis," id. at 49, and that there is "no reasoned way to determine ... what
type of injuries are distinct to RICO," id. at 50.
" See generally W. PaOSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 263-67 (4th ed. 1971)
(discussion of usefulness of causation theory as liability-limiting mechanism); Pollock, The
"Injury" and "Causation" Elements of a Treble-Damage Antitrust Action, 57 Nw. U.L.
REv. 691, 700 (1963) (indirect injury not compensable under antitrust laws); Ryu, Causation
in Criminal Law, 106 U. PA. L. REv. 773, 786-91 (1958) (theoretical discussion of proximate
cause and criteria necessary to establish a functional system of causation).
78 442 U.S. 330 (1979).
71 Id. at 339. The plaintiff in Reiter brought a class action on behalf of herself and all
others in the United States who had purchased hearing aids from the defendants. Id. at 335.
She alleged that her class was injured by having to pay prices artificially inflated as a result
of antitrust violations. Id. The Court held that consumer injury fell within the purview of
the Clayton Act as an injury to property. Id. at 339; see Chattanooga Foundry & Pipe
Works v. City of Atlanta, 203 U.S. 390, 396 (1906). The Chattanooga Court stated that "[a]
person whose property is diminished by a payment of money wrongfully induced is injured
in his property." 203 U.S. at 396 (interpreting Clayton Act).
"0 See Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 338-39 (1979). Chief Justice Burger, dis-
cussing the proposed interpretation of "business or property," which would preclude con-
sumer actions as outside an intended commercial context, explained:
That strained construction would have us ignore the disjunctive "or" and rob
the term "property" of its independent and ordinary significance; moreover, it
would convert the noun "business" into an adjective. In construing a statute we
are obliged to give effect, if possible, to every word Congress used. Canons of con-
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The use of the antitrust analogy to support a restrictive stand-
ing requirement also is weak."' Senator McClellan, a sponsor of
RICO, explicitly rejected any intention to import the complexity of
antitrust law to RICO. 2 Whereas the purpose of the antitrust laws
is to protect free competition in the economy,"' the purpose of
RICO is to eradicate organized crime.8 ' Any reservations that may
be held about severely damaging an otherwise legitimate business
guilty of an antitrust violation would not be relevant to the de-
struction of racketeering interests.8 ' RICO draws on an antitrust
remedy to address a different, and indeed graver, problem. The
goal of RICO is not so purely utilitarian as that of the antitrust
laws. Although interference with free competition certainly is one
of the problems the drafters intended to attack, it was simply a
struction ordinarily suggest that terms connected by a disjunctive be given sepa-
rate meanings, unless the context dictates otherwise; here it does not. Congress'
use of the word "or" makes plain that "business" was not intended to modify
"property," nor was "property" intended to modify "business."
Id. (citations omitted).
81 See Schacht v. Brown, 711 F.2d 1343, 1358 (7th Cir. 1983). Overreliance on the anti-
trust analogy is misplaced in that it confuses the methods of the statute with the objectives
of the statute. By incorporating the treble damage provision, Congress "did no more than
adapt an antitrust tool to the attack on organized crime." Note, supra note 18, at 1112; see
infra notes 83-87 and accompanying text.
82 115 CONG. REc. 9567 (1969) (remarks of Sen. McClellan); see also Hellenic Lines,
Ltd. v. O'Hearn, 523 F. Supp. 244, 248 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (Congress did not intend that there
be a competitive injury standard); 116 CONG. REc. 607 (1970) (remarks of Sen. Byrd); 116
CONG. REc. at 35,193 (remarks of Rep. Pof); House Hearings, supra note 31, at 149. Indeed,
the judicially imposed standing requirements for antitrust plaintiffs have been widely criti-
cized. See, e.g., Alioto & Donnici, Standing Requirements for Antitrust Plaintiffs: Judi-
cially Created Exceptions to a Clear Statutory Policy, 4 U.S.F.L. REv. 205, 207-09 (1970);
Handler, The Shift from Substantive to Procedural Innovations in Antitrust Suits-The
Twenty-Third Annual Antitrust Review, 71 COLUM. L. Rv. 1, 24 (1971); Tyler, Private
Antitrust Litigation: The Problem of Standing, 49 U. CoLo. L. REv. 269, 270-72 (1978);
Note, An Illusory Expansion of Consumer Standing Under Section 4 of the Clayton Act, 3
W. NEw ENG. L. REv. 81, 87, 97-98 (1980).
SS See, e.g., Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 344 (1962); Northern Pac.
Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958); L. SULLIVAN, ANTITRUST § 3, at 13 (1977).
84See supra notes 16 & 25-32 and accompanying text.
91 Bennett v. Berg, 685 F.2d 1053, 1059 (8th Cir. 1982), aff'd on rehearing, 710 F.2d
1361, 1364 (8th Cir. 1983) (en banc); Blakey & Gettings, supra note 15, at 1042; Strafer,
Massumi & Skolnick, supra note 18, at 694-95. Bankrupting an antitrust violator usually
would reduce competition in an industry or market, thus frustrating the purpose of the
antitrust laws. See Berger & Bernstein, An Analytical Framework for Antitrust Standing,
86 Y A L.J. 809, 850-52 (1977); Blakey & Gettings, supra note 15, at 1042. Bankrupting a
RICO violator, on the other hand, would be "completely consonant with statutory goals,"
Strafer, Massumi & Skolnick, supra note 18, at 695, in that it would deprive racketeers of
their assets, id. Strafer, Massumi and Skolnick have aptly described the goals of RICO as
purgative, as opposed to the preservative goals of the antitrust laws. Id. at 694.
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part of the overall menace posed by organized crime."' The objec-
tive of RICO is to rid the economy of a moral corruption that not
only interferes with the free flow of goods and services, but also
taints the climate of justice in our society. Nor was the objective of
RICO solely to prevent the infiltration of legitimate business.8 7
While subsections (a) and (b) of section 1962 are designed to out-
law the infiltration, acquisition, and control of enterprises by crim-
inal money or criminal methods,88 section 1962(c) prohibits the
conduct or participation in such enterprises through criminal
methods.8 ' Thus, section 1962(c) would be superfluous if RICO
were limited merely to infiltration of legitimate businesses.
The examples given by courts and commentators advocating
the competitive or racketeering enterprise injury theory are tenu-
ous, and no proponent of the theory has ever explained in concrete
terms the precise nature of this injury.9" These artificial standing
requirements, it is submitted, are without adequate foundation in
the statutory language or the congressional intent. Indeed, pre-
cluding the direct victims of arson, bribery, extortion, and other
serious organized crime offenses would effectively emasculate the
private cause of action and actively subvert congressional intent.91
"' See, e.g., Schacht v. Brown, 711 F.2d 1343, 1358 (7th Cir. 1983). In Schacht, the
Seventh Circuit correctly noted that the exercise of power by organized crime must be con-
sidered "malum in se." Id. (citation omitted). There can be no question that Congress' con-
cern was with the effect of organized crime on society as a whole, not merely on the mob's
business competition. See, e.g., Senate Hearings, supra note 33, at 278 (remarks of Sen.
Pepper) (expressing concern over effects of organized crime on the poor); see id. at 445
(message from President Nixon) ("most tragic victims [of organized crime] . . . are the
poor"); 116 CONG. REc. 602 (1970) (remarks of Sen. Yarborough) (organized crime "preys
primarily on the poor and the uneducated and adds further oppression to the social and
economic disadvantages already borne by these people"). Indeed, after a thorough examina-
tion of the legislative history, the following conclusion seems inescapable:
Because Congress accurately perceived that workers, consumers, and poor
people, as well as business competitors, are primary victims of racketeering, it
would be absurd to construe RICO's civil provisions so as to deny them the ability
to utilize those provisions to redress their injuries .... Congress ... having so
broadly defined the class of RICO victims, it is inconceivable that the legislators
meant to deny civil relief for all victims but that sub-class which can show "com-
petitive injury" in the antitrust sense.
Strafer, Massumi & Skolnick, supra note 18, at 701-02; see also Note, supra note 18, at 1113
(RICO "focuses as much on ensuring a fair market as on ensuring an efficient one").
87 See, e.g., United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 590 (1981).
88 See supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text.
" See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
80 See, e.g., Eisenberg v. Gagnon, 564 F. Supp. 1347, 1352-53 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
9' See, e.g., Schacht v. Brown, 711 F.2d 1343, 1358 (7th Cir. 1983); Windsor Assocs. v.
Greenfeld, 564 F. Supp. 273, 279 (D. Md. 1983); D'Iorio v. Adonizio, 554 F. Supp. 222, 230-
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Problems arise not when RICO is used to deliver a forceful eco-
nomic blow against racketeers, but rather when RICO enters the
gray areas of questionable, unethical or fraudulent business prac-
tices and transactions gone sour." In these situations, RICO con-
flicts with established principles of law which were carefully devel-
oped to deal with subtle and complex problems and has the
potential to create disequilibrium in a manner never contemplated
by Congress.
SECURITIES FRAUD
Since RICO includes "fraud in the sale of securities" as a
predicate offense, most violations of the antifraud provisions of the
securities laws can be pleaded to fall within the parameters of the
statute.94 The commercial issuance, purchase, or sale of a security
invariably will entail the use of an enterprise.9 5 In addition, if the
mails or wires are used in furtherance of the fraudulent scheme,
violations of the mail or wire statutes can be alleged as predicate
offenses.96 As long as two predicate offenses and a related enter-
prise can be alleged, the complaint will fall within the technical
31 (M.D. Pa. 1982); see Crocker Nat'l Bank v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 555 F. Supp. 47, 49-50
(N.D. Cal. 1982). The Crocker court stated:
The key purpose of RICO's civil remedy is to "divest the association of the
fruits of the ill-gotten gains." This purpose would be severely undermined if per-
sons who suffered direct harm from racketeering activity as defined by the statute
could not recover in the absence of a showing of some "special" harm or some
overall anti-competitive effect. Such a rule would leave money derived from ac-
tions prohibited by RICO precisely where Congress did not intend it to remain, in
the hands of RICO violators.
555 F. Supp. at 49-50 (citations omitted); see Strafer, Massumi & Skolnick, supra note 18,
at 706-07.
11 See infra notes 94-160 and accompanying text. Even those courts adopting a broad,
literal interpretation of the statute have expressed doubts as to the wisdom of its scope. See,
e.g., Schacht v. Brown, 711 F.2d 1343, 1361 (7th Cir. 1983) (Congress "may well have cre-
ated a runaway treble damage bonanza for the already excessively litigious"); Mauriber v.
Shearson/American Express, Inc., 567 F. Supp. 1231, 1240 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) ("wide spread
abuse of the civil provisions" cannot be curbed by judicial amendment).
93 See infra notes 95-117, 122-31 & 141-56 and accompanying text.
" See, e.g., Bankers Trust Co. v. Feldesman, 566 F. Supp. 1235, 1241 n.9 (S.D.N.Y.
1983) ("it is a simple task to allege a pattern of racketeering activity in virtually every se-
curities.., fraud case"); Hokama v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 566 F. Supp. 636, 643 (C.D. Cal.
1983). The Hokama court stated: "It is apparent... that RICO, if interpreted literally,
provides an added cause of action for treble damages in any securities fraud case involving
two or more unlawful sales." 566 F. Supp. at 643; see supra note 9 and accompanying text.
95 See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
" See supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text; infra notes 140-46 and accompanying
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
language of RICO. 7 Accordingly, some courts have allowed plain-
tiffs to state claims based on sets of operative facts which essen-
tially amount to multiple violations of the securities lawsY5 It is
submitted, however, that the wholesale escalation of ordinary se-
curities fraud violations into RICO claims was not within the con-
templation of Congress in enacting RICO. The analysis that fol-
lows illustrates the disruption that could accompany RICO's
intrusion into the securities field and suggests a means of limiting
RICO actions to those situations targeted by the Act and of rele-
gating other claims to more appropriate existing remedies.
Rule 10b-5,99 promulgated by the Securities and Exchange
Commission in 1942 under the authority of section 10(b)100 of the
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934101 (the 1934 Act), is the
broadest "catch-all" antifraud provision in the securities laws and
the provision most frequently utilized by civil plaintiffs. 02 The
97 See supra notes 6-13 and accompanying text.
"8 See, e.g., Kimmel v. Peterson, 565 F. Supp. 476, 490-95 (E.D. Pa. 1983); Liston v.
USLIFE Corp., 1982-1983 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 99,033, at 94,915 (C.D. Cal. 1982); Engl
v. Berg, 511 F. Supp. 1146, 1153-54 (E.D. Pa. 1981); Farmers Bank v. Bell Mortgage Corp.,
452 F. Supp. 1278, 1279-80 (D. Del. 1978). Some courts also have allowed plaintiffs to state
claims based solely on multiple instances of commodities fraud. See Parnes v. Heinold Com-
modities, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 645, 647 (N.D. IlM. 1980); Heinold Commodities, Inc. v. McCarty,
513 F. Supp. 311, 313 (N.D. IlM. 1979).
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1983). Rule 10b-5 provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility
of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security.
Id.
100 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982).
101 Ch. 404, tit. 1, § 1, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk
(1982)).
102 See, e.g., Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 103 S. Ct. 683, 687 (1983); Chiarella v.
United States, 445 U.S. 222, 234-35 (1980); Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S.
128, 151 (1972). Rule 10b-5 has been the most widely litigated SEC regulation. See SEC v.
National Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 465 (1969). Although the 1934 Act did not create an ex-
press right of action under section 10(b), courts have implied a private cause of action for
over 35 years. See Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 514-15 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
Indeed, the Supreme Court recently has affirmed the existence of an implied cause of action
under section 10(b) for conduct subject to other express civil remedies under the Securities
Act of 1933 (the 1933 Act) and the 1934 Act. Herman & MacLean, 103 S. Ct. at 690.
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1934 Act limits recovery to actual damages.103 Yet, the application
of RICO to multiple violations of rule 10b-5 would automatically
triple the recovery available to a plaintiff without any indication
that Congress intended to supersede the securities laws.104 It is sig-
nificant to note that when Congress extensively amended the fed-
eral securities laws in 1975,105 after the enactment of RICO but
before its implications in the civil sphere were generally recog-
nized,106 it made only minor changes in the antifraud provisions.1
0 7
Some commentators have advocated that RICO be employed
to circumvent limitations on private 10b-5 actions imposed by the
1" 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (1982); see Byrnes v. Faulkner, Dawkins & Sullivan, 550 F.2d
1303, 1313 (2d Cir. 1977); Globus v. Law Research Serv., Inc., 418 F.2d 1276, 1283-86 (2d
Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 913 (1970). Punitive damages are unavailable under the
Securities Act of 1933. E.g., Hill York Corp. v. American Int'l Franchises, Inc., 448 F.2d 680,
697 (5th Cir. 1971); Avern Trust v. Clarke, 415 F.2d 1238, 1242 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
397 U.S. 963 (1970).
104 See supra note 39 and accompanying text. Congress is currently considering a pro-
posal that would provide treble damages for insider trading. See Insider Trading Sanctions
Act of 1983, H.R. 559, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1983). This bill, however, expressly provides
for treble damages only in actions brought by the SEC. Id. § 2(A). Moreover, the imposition
of treble damages would be within the discretion of the court "in light of the facts and
circumstances," unlike the automatic treble damages available under RICO. Id.
105 Securities Acts Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-29, 89 Stat. 97 (codified as
amended at scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. (1982)). The Securities Acts Amendments of
1975 were the result of "the most searching reexamination of the competitive, statutory, and
economic issues facing the securities markets, the securities industry, and, of course, public
investors, since the 1930's." H.R. REP. No. 229, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 91, reprinted in 1975
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 321, 322. The 1975 amendments were termed "the most sub-
stantial and significant revision of the country's Federal securities laws since the passage of
the Securities Exchange Act in 1934." Securities Acts Amendments of 1975: Hearings on
S.249 Before the Subcomm. on Securities of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and
Urban Affairs, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1975) (statement of Sen. Williams).
106 Research reveals only two reported cases dealing with private civil RICO actions
through 1975: Barr v. WUI/TAS, Inc., 66 F.R.D. 109, 113 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (requiring organ-
ized crime nexus), and King v. Vesco, 342 F. Supp. 120, 121-23 (N.D. Cal. 1972) (dismissed
for improper venue).
107 Sections 15(c)(1) and 15(c)(2) of the 1934 Act (applying to broker-dealers) were
amended to include municipal securities dealers, in addition to some other minor altera-
tions. Securities Acts Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-29, 89 Stat. 97, 125-26 (codified
at 15 U.S.C. § 78o (1982)). No alterations of the damages provisions were made. In holding
that a private action under section 10(b) was not displaced by the existence of express reme-
dies in the 1933 Act, the Supreme Court in Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 103 S. Ct.
683 (1983), inferred congressional approval of existing case law interpretation from Con-
gress' decision to leave section 10(b) intact. Id. at 686-87. Similarly, in Blue Chip Stamps v.
Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975), the Supreme Court found that Congress' failure to
reject the purchaser/seller rule "argues significantly in favor of [the rule's] acceptance
.. ." Id. at 733; see also Blau v. Lehman, 368 U.S. 403, 413 (1962).
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Supreme Court in recent years.108 In particular, they have argued
that RICO may be employed by plaintiffs who otherwise would be
denied standing by the purchaser-seller rule.10 In denying a chal-
lenge to the purchaser-seller rule in Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor
Drug Stores,110 the Supreme Court considered the problem of vex-
atious litigation in the securities field.11 Expansion of the plaintiff
class, the Court found, would greatly increase the risk of strike
suits instituted only for their settlement value.1 2 The Court deter-
mined that the danger of vexatious litigation in rule 10b-5 actions
was "different in degree and in kind"113 from that in ordinary liti-
gation, and that relaxation of the rule would encourage plaintiffs to
seek "largely conjectural and speculative" awards. 4 These dangers
could only be enhanced if RICO's treble damages and liberal
standing features were available for violations of 10b-5. 115 Further-
more, insincere plaintiffs hoping to coerce settlement through a
strike suit will have the additional unwarranted advantage of being
able to label the defendant publicly as a racketeer." 6
108 See, e.g., Long, supra note 13, at 205-06; Note, supra note 18, at 1115-18; Comment,
supra note 18, at 942-43. At least one commentator has pointed out that using mail or wire
fraud as the predicate offenses will allow a plaintiff to avoid fitting the basis of the suit
within the technical definition of security. See Long, supra note 13, at 205 n.31.
109 See Long, supra note 13, at 204-05; Note, supra note 18, at 1115; Comment, supra
note 18, at 943-44. The purchaser/seller rule limits standing under rule 10b-5 to those plain-
tiffs who actually purchased or sold the security during the relevant time period. Comment,
supra note 18, at 943.44.
110 421 U.S. 723, 731, 755 (1975). The purchaser/seller rule was first enunciated in Birn-
baum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461, 463 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952).
111 421 U.S. at 737-49. The Court noted that expanded civil liability "'will lead to large
judgments, payable in the last analysis by innocent investors, for the benefit of speculators
and their lawyers. . . .'" Id. at 739 (quoting SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833,
867 (2d Cir. 1968) (Friendly, J., concurring), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1005 (1971)).
"I See 421 U.S. at 739-42.
113 Id. at 739.
114 Id. at 734-35.
"' In Blue Chip Stamps, the Supreme Court emphasized the idea of balance in the
securities field, quoting Judge Hufstedler's dissent in the court of appeals:
"The purchaser-seller rule has maintained the balances built into the congres-
sional scheme by permitting damage actions to be brought only by those persons
whose active participation in the marketing transaction promises enforcement of
the statute without undue risk of abuse of the litigation process and without dis-
torting the securities market."
Id. at 739 (quoting Manor Drug Stores v. Blue Chip Stamps, 492 F.2d 136, 147 (9th Cir.
1973) (Hufstedler, J., dissenting), rev'd, 421 U.S. 723 (1975)). It is submitted that these
balances could be severely disrupted by the wholesale incorporation of RICO treble damages
and liberal standing features into the securities field.
118 See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
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Much emphasis is placed on interpreting RICO in a manner
consistent with its plain language. If, however, a literal interpreta-
tion of a statute would lead to absurd results, the judiciary is not
compelled to afford it a literal interpretation. 117 Indeed, the Su-
preme Court has recognized that "a thing may be within the letter
of the statute and yet not within the statute, because not within its
spirit, nor within the intention of its makers."118 This maxim is
particularly appropriate where there is extant a body of law de-
signed specifically to deal with fraud in the sale of securities.119
"7 R. DicKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES 232 (1975); see
United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 580 (1981) ("absurd results are to be avoided" in
interpreting RICO). In Guiseppi v. Walling, 144 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1944), aff'd sub nom.
Gemsco, Inc. v. Walling, 324 U.S. 244 (1945), Judge Learned Hand explained the necessity
of examining the spirit of the statute:
There is no surer way to misread any document than to read it literally .... As
nearly as we can, we must put ourselves in the place of those who uttered the
words, and try to divine how they would have dealt with the unforeseen situation;
and, although their words are by far the most decisive evidence of what they
would have done, they are by no means final.
Id. at 624 (Hand, J., concurring).
118 Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 459 (1892), quoted in
United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 201 (1979). In Church of the Holy Trinity, an
ordained minister from England contracted with an American church to serve as its rector
and pastor. 143 U.S. at 457-58. This contract was in apparent violation of a statute that
prohibited the importation of aliens under contract "to perform labor or service of any kind
... ." Id. at 458. Although the minister clearly fell within the statutory language and with-
out any of the statutory exceptions, the Supreme Court held that this type of contract was
not within the contemplation of Congress in enacting the statute and thus the act could not
be enforced against the church. Id. at 472; see United States v. American Trucking Ass'ns,
310 U.S. 534, 543-44 (1940). The American Trucking Court stated: "Frequently,. . . even
when the plain meaning did not produce absurd results but merely an unreasonable one
'plainly at variance with the policy of the legislation as a whole' [the] Court has followed
that purpose, rather than the literal words." 310 U.S. at 543 (footnote omitted) (quoting
Ozawa v. United States, 260 U.S. 178, 194 (1922)). See generally Murphy, Old Maxims
Never Die: The "Plain-Meaning Rule" and Statutory Interpretation in the "Modern" Fed-
eral Courts, 75 COLUM. L. REv. 1299, 1301-02 (1975).
,19 See Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551, 558-59 (1982). In Marine Bank, the Su-
preme Court held that a certificate of deposit with a 6-year maturity was not a "security"
within the meaning of the federal securities laws. Id. at 559; see 15 U.S.C. §§ 77b(1),
78c(a)(1) (1982). The presence of extensive federal banking regulation was an important
factor considered in declining to afford the plaintiff the protection of the federal securities
laws. See 455 U.S. at 558-59. Indeed, the Court stated: "It is unnecessary to subject issuers
of bank certificates of deposit to liability under the antifraud provisions of the federal secur-
ities laws since the holders of bank certificates of deposit are abundantly protected under
the federal banking laws." Id. at 559.
In Train v. Colorado Pub. Interest Research Group, Inc., 426 U.S. 1 (1976), the Su-
preme Court considered the issue of whether the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
had authority under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA) to regulate the
discharge of certain types of radioactive materials into navigable waters. Id. at 3-4. Although
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Therefore, it is suggested, a complaint which purports to state
a claim under RICO but alleges only multiple acts of securities vio-
lations as the predicate offenses, should be governed solely by the
securities laws, and, in accordance with congressional intent, a
plaintiff should be limited to the appropriate remedies under that
body of law.120 Consistent with this analysis, a complaint which
couples a securities violation with a different predicate offense, for
example, bribery or extortion, should survive a motion to dismiss.
The latter complaint, it is suggested, indicates the type of racke-
teering activity with which Congress was concerned when RICO
was passed, while the former merely allows plaintiffs to circumvent
a jurisprudential system constructed specifically for the purpose of
regulating the sale of securities. Moreover, the requirement that a
securities violation be accompanied by a different predicate offense
in order to state a claim under RICO can be applied to future fac-
tual settings without the subjectivity associated with the existing
judicial restrictions and without the same risks of contradictory
and inequitable results.
The present federal securities laws are the product of 50 years
of thoughtful judicial, legislative, and administrative development.
"radioactive materials" were specifically included within the definition of "pollutants" in
the FWPCA, see 33 U.S.C. § 1362(6) (1976), the Court held that Congress had intended that
the regulation of the discharge of these radioactive materials be left with the Nuclear Regu-
latory Commission (NRC), 426 U.S. at 25. Thus, the Court exempted from EPA regulation
under the FWPCA the discharge of those types of radioactive materials regulated by the
NRC. 426 U.S. at 25. To have adopted the apparent "plain meaning" of the statute to
include
[radioactive] materials under the FWPCA would have marked a significant altera-
tion of the pervasive regulatory scheme .... Far from containing the clear indi-
cation of legislative intent that we might expect before recognizing such a change
in policy, . . . the legislative history reflects, on balance, an intention to preserve
the pre-existing regulatory plan.
Id. at 24 (citations omitted). The Court also noted that the House had rejected an amend-
ment that would have accomplished the same result as a literal reading of the statute. Id. at
23 n.19; see 119 CONG. REC. 42,615-16 (1973); supra note 105-07 and accompanying text.
120 The proposed analysis is to be based on an examination of the operative facts al-
leged in the complaint. Thus, a plaintiff who alleges predicate acts of mail or wire fraud
based on the same fraudulent securities scheme will not be permitted to bootstrap his secur-
ities claim to a RICO claim on the basis of the mail or wire fraud allegation. See infra notes
140-60 and accompanying text. However, nothing suggested here would preclude a plaintiff
from including a state common-law fraud claim under the pendent jurisdiction of the court
and recovering punitive damages therefor if the state law so provides. See, e.g., Nye v. Blyth
Eastman Dillon & Co., 588 F.2d 1189, 1200 (8th Cir. 1978); Coffee v. Permian Corp., 474
F.2d 1040, 1044 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 920 (1973); Evans v. Kerbs & Co., 411 F.
Supp. 616, 624 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
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Allowing treble damages and expanding the class of potential
plaintiffs through RICO would frustrate carefully considered policy
decisions in direct contravention of legislative intent without any
corresponding impact on the targeted activity, organized crime.12 1
Therefore, unless elements which go beyond securities violations
can be alleged, the courts should restrict a plaintiff's claim to the
appropriate securities doctrines and remedies, and decline to con-
sider a RICO claim.
An issue related to the use of RICO in conventional securities
fraud cases is the employment of RICO in the context of a hostile
tender offer. Since one of the primary objectives of RICO is to pre-
vent the infiltration of legitimate businesses by organized crime,
many legitimate businessmen who find themselves managing a cor-
poration whose stock is being acquired by a hostile entity have re-
sponded by filing RICO actions in an attempt to stave off a take-
over.122 If a plaintiff can prove that the funds used to finance the
121 See supra notes 24-40 and accompanying text. It is submitted that a statute explic-
itly designed to curb the ravages of organized crime is ill-equipped for the complex and
often facially ambiguous fact situations that typically fall under Rule 10b-5. Indeed, Rule
10b-5 has been interpreted "so loosely that it is closer to unfairness than to what either
lawyers or laymen usually think of as fraud." 1 A. BROMBERG & L. LowFNFELS, SECURrMS
FRA D & COMMODrms FRA uD § 1.1, at 1:5 (1983); see also Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug
Stores, 421 U.S. at 744-45 ("the typical fact situation in which the classic tort of misrepre-
sentation and deceit evolved was light years away from the world of commercial transactions
to which Rule 10b-5 is applicable"). It may be suggested that insider trading, for example,
seldom rises to a level of perniciousness equivalent to that of murder, arson, extortion, or
drug trafficking.
"' See, e.g., Dan River, Inc. v. Icahn, 701 F.2d 278, 281, 284-85 (4th Cir. 1983); Trane
Co. v. O'Connor Sec., 561 F. Supp. 301, 303-04 (S.D.N.Y.), appeal dismissed as moot, 718
F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1983); Hanna Mining Co. v. Norcen Energy Resources Ltd., 1982 Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH) 1 98,742, at 93,733 (N.D. Ohio 1982); Marshall Field & Co. v. Icahn, 537 F.
Supp. 413, 420 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
Illustrative of the use of RICO in a takeover battle is Dan River, Inc. v. Icahn, 701 F.2d
278 (4th Cir. 1983). In Dan River, Icaln, a prominent arbitrageur, had acquired more than
5% of Dan River's stock and had accordingly filed the schedule 13D disclosure statement
required by section 13(d) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1) (1982). 701 F.2d at 280.
Icahn's 13D statement indicated that he intended to obtain control of Dan River or to sell
the shares if he received an acceptable offer. Id. at 280-81. Dan River countered by filing
suit, basing its complaint on securities violations and a RICO claim, in addition to pendent
state claims. Id. at 281-82. The gravamen of the RICO complaint was Icahn's use of funds
obtained from the Bayswater Realty & Capital Corporation. Id. at 289. The plaintiff alleged
that Bayswater fraudulently and unlawfully failed to register as an investment company
under the Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-8 (1982), see 701 F.2d at 289-
90, and, thus, Bayswater's employment by Icahn in the acquisition was unlawful, id. at 289.
Consequently, according to Dan River, the funds derived from Bayswater were obtained as
the result of a pattern of racketeering activity. Id. at 290. Dan River also alleged that
Icahn's statement in his 13D filing that he would sell at an acceptable price or propose a
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stock purchases were acquired through a pattern of racketeering
activity, he will be able to state a claim under RICO. 12 3 The funds
need not be traced directly to the alleged racketeering activity,
but, it has been held, need only have "allowed or facilitated" the
defendant's proposed acquisition.124 In addition, if a plaintiff is
able to allege that the would-be acquirer committed two or more
predicate acts of securities or mail fraud in connection with the
offer, for example, two allegedly fraudulent misstatements in SEC
filings, he may be able to state a RICO claim."25
The usefulness of alleging a RICO claim in the midst of a bat-
tle for corporate control cannot be underestimated. The ability to
label a would-be acquirer publicly as a racketeer can prove to be a
potent defensive tactic.1 21 Perhaps more importantly, a RICO
charge has the potential to expand greatly the scope of discovery
available to a plaintiff. 2 7 Since the underlying predicate offenses
may have occurred as early as 10 years prior to the litigation, a
defendant may be required to reveal to its adversary every aspect
of its business within that 10-year period.128 Moreover, although
tender offer was extortionate. Id. Dan River moved for a preliminary injunction, which the
district court granted in part, sterilizing Icahn's stock in the plaintiff. See id. at 282. On
appeal, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Dan River had not
demonstrated the likelihood of success on the underlying securities counts or the RICO
claims. Id. at 290.
1.2 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) (1982); supra note 11 and accompanying text.
124 Spencer Cos. v. Agency Rent-A-Car, Inc., 1981-1982 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
98,361, at 92,215-16 (D. Mass. 1981) (quoting United States v. McNary, 620 F.2d 621, 628-29
(7th Cir. 1980)). The Spencer court stated: "All the statute requires is that any part of the
income so derived, or even the 'proceeds' of such income, was used 'directly or indirectly' to
acquire an interest in the other enterprise." Spencer, 1981-1982 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
98,361, at 92,215.
'2' See 18 U.S.C. § 1962(b) (1982); see supra note 6 and accompanying text. Target
issuers typically peg their RICO claims on allegedly fraudulent statements in the acquirers'
13D statements, which are filed with the SEC after five percent or more of the plaintiffs'
shares are purchased. See, e.g., Trane Co. v. O'Connor Sec., 561 F. Supp. 301, 307-08
(S.D.N.Y.), appeal dismissed as moot, 718 F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1983); Spencer Cos. v. Agency
Rent-A-Car, Inc., 1981-1982 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 9 98,361, at 92,214-15 (D. Mass. 1981).
"' See supra note 47 and accompanying text. It may be suggested that, although secur-
ities lawyers and arbitrageurs may be worldly enough to ignore the pejorative aspects of a
"racketeering" charge, the investing public may not be so sophisticated. It also may be ar-
gued that the ease with which a public racketeering charge can be made undermines one of
the major objectives of the securities laws: public confidence in the capital markets.
27 See Spencer Cos. v. Agency Rent-A-Car, Inc., 1981-1982 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1
98,361, at 92,217 (D. Mass. 1981).
128 Id; see 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (1982); supra note 6 and accompanying text. Under the
liberal discovery philosophy of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a party generally may
obtain discovery of all non-privileged information that "appears reasonably calculated to
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the law still is unsettled as to the availability of equitable relief
under RICO, 2 s a plaintiff also may be able to obtain a preliminary
lead to the discovery of admissible evidence." FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1); see 4 J. MOoRE & J.
LUCAS, MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE V 26.56[1] (2d ed. 1983). Thus, in the case of a large,
publicly held corporation, RICO presents the possibility for the discovery of enormous
amounts of material relating to almost all of a defendant's business activities over a 10-year
period. Clearly, the potential for vexation inherent in such an endeavor can in itself serve as
an additional weapon with which to threaten a defendant.
,29 See, e.g., Trane Co. v. O'Connor Sec., 718 F.2d 26, 29 (2d Cir. 1983); Dan River, Inc.
v. Icahn, 701 F.2d 278, 290 (4th Cir. 1983). There is no express mention of private injunctive
relief in RICO. Section 1964(a) of title 18 provides the federal courts with jurisdiction to
grant equitable relief. 1.8 U.S.C. § 1964(a) (1982). Section 1964(b) authorizes the Attorney
General to institute proceedings under section 1964. Id. § 1964(b). Section 1964(c), however,
speaks only of a private right of action for treble damages. Id. § 1964(c).
Some courts have expressed doubts, therefore, about the propriety of private injunctive
relief, without expressly deciding the issue. See, e.g., Trane Co. v. O'Connor See., 718 F.2d
26, 28 (2d Cir. 1983); Dan River, Inc. v. Icahn, 701 F.2d 278, 290 (4th Cir. 1983); cf. Ashland
Oil, Inc. v. Gleave, 540 F. Supp. 81, 84-85 (W.D.N.Y. 1982) (private party not entitled to a
prejudgment attachment under section 1964). But cf. USACO Coal Co. v. Carbomin Energy,
Inc., 539 F. Supp. 807, 814-16 (W.D. Ky.) (preliminary injunction granted on the basis of
pendent state claims), afl'd, 689 F.2d 94 (6th Cir. 1982); Vietnamese Fishermen's Ass'n v.
Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, 518 F. Supp. 993, 1014, 1016 (S.D. Tex. 1981) (injunction
granted on other grounds). One district court granted a preliminary RICO injunction but
later termed the issue an "open question." Aetna Casualty and Sur. Co. v. Liebowitz, 570 F.
Supp. 908, 911 (E.D.N.Y. 1983).
Professor Blakey has asserted that private equitable relief is available, citing the propo-
sition that a grant of a right to sue conveys the availability of "all necessary and appropriate
relief." Blakey & Gettings, supra note 15, at 1037-38 & n.133 (citing Sullivan v. Little Hunt-
ing Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229, 239 (1969), and Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946)); see also
Blakey, supra note 18, at 330-41. He also found significant the fact that the damages clause
was preceded by "and," rather than "to." Blakey, supra note 18, at 332. However, in the
only published opinion to date to decide the issue directly, Kaushal v. State Bank of India,
556 F. Supp. 576 (N.D. IM. 1983), the District Court for the Northern District of Illinois
forcefully rejected the possibility of private injunctive relief. Id. at 581-84. Describing Pro-
fessor Blakey's argument as "bizarre and wholly unconvincing as a matter of plain English,"
the court declined to imply a private equitable remedy. Id. at 582. Noting that jurisdiction,
cause of action, and relief are distinct concepts, the court determined that, by negative im-
plication of the statute, private parties were not granted the power to invoke the court's
equitable jurisdiction. Id. at 582-84. It is submitted that this holding is a correct interpreta-
tion of the statute. Although the analogous antitrust laws provide a specific grant of equita-
ble remedies, see 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1982), Congress rejected amendments that would have
explicitly granted this right, see, e.g., S. 13, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. § 1(a)(4), 119 CONG. REC.
10,319-21 (1973); S. 1623, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 3(c), 115 CONG. REc. 6996 (1969). In addi-
tion, recent Supreme Court decisions militate against implying a remedy in a complex statu-
tory system in the absence of "strong indicia" of congressional intent. See, e.g., Middlesex
County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1981); Trans-
america Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 19 (1979). For an examination of the
legislative history regarding private equitable relief, see Strafer, Massumi & Skolnick, supra
note 18, at 712-13. Strafer, Massumi and Skolnick conclude that the legislative history "does
not shed much light on whether Congress intended to provide broad, equitable relief for
private plaintiffs." Id. at 712.
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or permanent RICO injunction forestalling the takeover attempt.
Thus, the temptation to file a RICO claim in response to a hostile
tender offer or stock acquisition is apparent.
While it is recognized that RICO may have some application
in certain corporate takeovers, 130 it is submitted that the use of
RICO in a typical hostile stock acquisition should be carefully cir-
cumscribed because of the potential for conflict within the existing
body of securities law and regulation. Indeed, the argument that
Congress had no intention of significantly altering the existing se-
curities laws when it enacted RICO 311 is even more compelling in
the context of tender offers. Just 2 years before the enactment of
RICO, Congress passed comprehensive legislation, the Williams
Act,132 designed specifically to deal with abuses in corporate tender
offers. 133 In enacting RICO, "Congress was out to attack the prob-
130 See infra note 138 and accompanying text.
See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
131 Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454 (1968) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)
(E), 78n(d)-(f) (1982)); see also 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-e (1983).
133 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)(E), 78n(d)-(f) (1982); see H.R. REP. No. 1711, 90th Cong., 2d
Sess. 1, reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2811, 2811. Section 14(e) of the
Williams Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1982), prohibits any misstatement or omission of material
fact, and the use of any fraudulent or manipulative act or practice in connection with any
tender offer. Id. Like other provisions of the 1933 and 1934 Acts, the Williams Act seeks to
protect investors and shareholders through a policy of full disclosure. See H.R. REP. No.
1711, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2811, 2811. In
order to ensure investor protection against the myriad of potential abusive tactics that
would be developed, Congress instructed the SEC to adopt rules and regulations to "define,
and prescribe means reasonably designed to prevent, such acts and practices as are fraudu-
lent, deceptive, or manipulative." 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e). Thus, Congress envisioned that the
SEC would develop a comprehensive regulatory scheme to ensure investor protection in con-
nection with tender offers. The SEC has accordingly promulgated regulations that go far
beyond the prevention of what would be considered criminal schemes to defraud. See, e.g.,
17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-l(a) (1983) (time limitation on withdrawal of offer); id. § 240.14e-l(b)
(restricting increases in consideration); id. § 240.14e-2(a) (requiring that target company
take public position on offer); 1976-1977 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 80,659, at 86,692 (1976)
(proposal that failure to provide shareholder list on demand would constitute a "fraudulent,
deceptive and manipulative act or practice"). Moreover, in some cases, the Williams Act has
been construed so broadly that one court has expressed the fear that "virtually every defen-
sive action by an offeror or a target company, or their lawyers, in connection with a tender
offer, could conceivably satisfy [a] broad test of 'manipulative' conduct. . . ." Data Probe
Acquisition Corp. v. Datatab, Inc., 568 F. Supp. 1538, 1550 (S.D.N.Y.) (citing Mobil Corp. v.
Marathon Oil Co., 669 F.2d 366 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 982 (1982)), rev'd, 722
F.2d 1 (2d Cir. 1983).
Although the proper scope of the Williams Act is still a subject of some controversy,
compare Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co., 669 F.2d 366, 377 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. denied,
455 U.S. 982 (1982) (granting of lock-up options held to be violative of the Act) with Buffalo
Forge, Co. v. Ogden Corp., 717 F.2d 757, 760 (2d Cir. 1983) (Marathon found to be an
unwarranted extension of the Act), it is clear that much of the conduct deemed unlawful
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lem of organized crime, not the problems of corporate control and
risk arbitrage. ' 13 4 Therefore, it is urged that an analysis similar to
that suggested above135 be employed by the courts in assessing the
validity of a RICO infiltration claim. This analysis should focus on
the underlying predicate offenses alleged to constitute the pattern
of racketeering activity that was employed to acquire a corporate
interest or from which the allegedly "tainted" funds were de-
rived.1 36 If the pattern consists of no more than securities viola-
tions, the relevant securities remedies should be the plaintiff's sole
redress.137 If, on the other hand, the pattern of racketeering activ-
ity includes offenses that go beyond the scope of the securities
laws, the RICO dlaim should stand. 13  This approach would aid in
deterring the potential abuse of RICO as yet another reflexive de-
fensive tactic in a battle for corporate control by confining RICO's
sanctions to the type of infiltration targeted by Congress, 139 while
under the Williams Act is quite far removed from the pernicious, organized criminal con-
duct targeted by RICO, see, e.g., Mobil, 669 F.2d at 371-73; Data Probe, 568 F. Supp. at
1547-48 (Williams Act protects investors not only against "devices designed to defraud or
misleadingly to manipulate prices," but also against "strategies that unduly pressure the
stockholder or impede the tender offer process").
'"Dan River, Inc. v. Icahn, 701 F.2d 278, 291 (4th Cir. 1983); see Harper v. New Japan
See. Int'l, Inc., 545 F. Supp. 1002, 1007-08 (C.D. Cal. 1982); Bayly Corp. v. Marantette, 1982
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 98,834, at 94,291 (D.D.C. 1982); cf. Trane Co. v. O'Connor Sec.,
718 F.2d 26, 28-29 (2d Cir. 1983) (expressly leaving open the question of whether securities
convictions are required for civil RICO liability).
235See supra notes 120-21 and accompanying text.
136 See supra notes 11-13 & 120-21 and accompanying text.
137 See supra notes 120-21 and accompanying text. One commentator has noted the
danger of allowing takeover targets to state a RICO claim whenever two misstatements in an
SEC filing can be alleged:
There probably has not been a single instance of a hostile tender offer case in
which the target company could not have made a ... claim of alleged false state-
ments arising from S.E.C. filings, and if the reporting requirements of the S.E.C.
can be bootstrapped into "racketeering activity," then the board rooms of corpo-
rate America will be peopled with more "racketeers" than Las Vegas and Atlantic
City combined or than in Chicago in its heyday.
Weinberg, Mother of God, is this the end of Rico?, 69 A.B.A. J. 130, 130 (1983).
I If a plaintiff were able to allege that the defendant engaged in extortion or bribery
in connection with the offer, a RICO claim would stand. See infra notes 156-60 and accom-
panying text.
139 Illustrative of the abusive employment of RICO in the framework of a hostile tender
offer is Hanna Mining Co. v. Norcen Energy Resources Ltd., 1982 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1
98,742, at 93,733 (N.D. Ohio 1982). Faced with a hostile tender offer by Norcen Energy
Resources Ltd. (Norcen), Hanna Mining Company (Hanna) fied an action to enjoin the
tender offer based on, inter alia, a RICO claim predicated on alleged securities fraud. Id. A
preliminary injunction was granted but, while the appeal to the Sixth Circuit was pending,
the parties entered into a settlement agreement on substantially the same terms as those
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allowing the statute to retain its vitality as a shield against crimi-
nal infiltration.
COMMON LAW FRAUD
Until the enactment of RICO, there was no private cause of
action under the federal mail or wire fraud statutes. 140 Victims of
common-law frauds committed through the use of the mails or
wires, in the absence of some other jurisdictional predicate, were
limited to state remedies. In recent years, however, as a result of
the growing awareness of the ease with which common-law frauds
could be transformed into RICO actions, plaintiffs in increasing
numbers have opted to pursue a treble damages remedy in federal
court on the basis of predicate allegations of mail or wire fraud.
141
The analysis that follows rejects an interpretation of RICO that
would encompass virtually all commercial fraud in favor of a nar-
rower approach more consistent with accepted principles of fed-
eral-state balance.
The mail and wire fraud'statutes are in pari materia, so the
cases interpreting each apply to the other.14 2 Two elements are
necessary to state a violation of the federal mail fraud statute: a
scheme to defraud, 4 s and the use of the mails to carry out the
proposed before the suit. Weinberg, supra note 137, at 131. The chairman of Norcen's
board, one of the original "racketeering" defendants, then was invited to join Henna's
board, an invitation quite inconsistent with a severe belief in the veracity of the racketeer-
ing charges. Id. Clearly, the bad faith employment of RICO as yet another bargaining chip
in a takeover struggle is far removed from any possible congressional intention. See supra
notes 24-40 and accompanying text.
"I' Moss v. Morgan Stanley Inc., 553 F. Supp. 1347, 1361 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd on other
grounds, 719 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1983); see Ryan v. Ohio Edison Co., 611 F.2d 1170, 1177-79 (6th
Cir. 1979); Bell v. Health-Mor, Inc., 549 F.2d 342, 346 (5th Cir. 1977).
14 See, e.g., Morosani v. First Nat'l Bank, 703 F.2d 1220, 1221-22 (11th Cir. 1983);
Bennett v. Berg, 685 F.2d 1053, 1062 (8th Cir. 1982), aff'd on rehearing, 710 F.2d 1361 (8th
Cir. 1983) (en banc); Kaushal v. State Bank of India, 556 F. Supp. 576, 580 (N.D. IM. 1983).
42 United States v. Giovengo, 637 F.2d 941, 944 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S.
1032 (1981); United States v. Tarnopol, 561 F.2d 466, 475 (3d Cir. 1977). See generally
Note, A Survey of the Mail Fraud Act, 8 MEM. ST. U.L. REv. 673, 673-83 (1978) (analysis of
elements necessary to constitute mail fraud offense).
143 See, e.g., Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1, 8 (1954); United States v. Lebovitz,
669 F.2d 894, 895-96 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 929 (1982); DeMier v. United States,
616 F.2d 366, 369 (8th Cir. 1980). A scheme to defraud requires a specific intent to defraud.
See United States v. Keane, 522 F.2d 534, 544 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 976
(1976); see also United States v. Dixon, 536 F.2d 1388, 1399 n.11 (2d Cir. 1976) (some harm
or injury must be intended). The scheme to defraud element, however, has been construed
expansively, see, e.g., Gregory v. United States, 253 F.2d 104, 109 (5th Cir. 1958) (scheme to
defraud is measured by standard "of moral uprightness, of fundamental honesty, fair play
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scheme.14 4 Each use of the mails is a separate violation, even if
there is only one scheme to defraud.1 45 Therefore, as long as a re-
lated enterprise can properly be pleaded, two mailings incident to
any essential element of the scheme should be sufficient to bring
the scheme under section 1962(c). 14e The potential is obvious, then,
for RICO to swallow up state common-law fraud, thereby placing a
substantially greater burden on the federal courts. 147 It is sug-
gested that Congress had no intention of usurping the states' tradi-
tional role in this area by providing federal jurisdiction for "garden
variety" claims. 148
The fact that Congress' primary target in enacting RICO was
organized crime is beyond question. 49 The fact that fraud is a rec-
ognized technique in the operations of organized crime is equally
clear.1 50 However, from these facts and from the legislative history,
it cannot be inferred that Congress intended to allow into federal
court nearly every business dispute in which two acts of deceit can
be alleged.151 Such a consequence, it is suggested, is revolutionary
and right dealing"), and includes schemes designed to deprive their victims of intangible
interests, see, e.g., United States v. Bohonus, 628 F.2d 1167, 1172 (9th Cir.) (loss of right to
honest services), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 928 (1980); United States v. Louderman, 576 F.2d
1383, 1387-88 (9th Cir.) (loss of right to privacy), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 896 (1978). The
broad reading given the wire fraud statute has moved one dissenter to assert that the stat-
ute was being read "to embody a federal law of fiduciary obligations, including an undefined
duty of yet further disclosure, enforceable by the sanctions of the criminal law." United
States v. Siegel, 717 F.2d 9, 24 (2d Cir. 1983) (Winters, J., dissenting in part, concurring in
part); cf. United States v. Von Barta, 635 F.2d 999, 1001 (2d Cir. 1980) (describing mail and
wire fraud statutes as "seemingly limitless"), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 998 (1981).
"4 See, e.g., Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1, 8 (1954); United States v. Lebovitz,
669 F.2d 894, 896 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 929 (1982). It is sufficient for mail fraud if
"the use of the mails merely furthers the scheme," United States v. Adamo, 534 F.2d 31, 36
(3d Cir.) (credit card fraud), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 841 (1976); see United States v. Gi-
ovengo, 637 F.2d 941, 944-45 (3d Cir. 1980) (wire fraud), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1032 (1981),
and that such use was reasonably foreseeable, Pereira, 347 U.S. at 8-9.
'45 See, e.g., United States v. Joyce, 499 F.2d 9, 18 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
1031 (1974).
"4 See United States v. Weatherspoon, 581 F.2d 595, 602 (7th Cir. 1978) (five mailings
pursuant to one scheme); United States v. Chovanec, 467 F. Supp. 41, 44 (S.D.N.Y. 1979)
(six instances of wire fraud pursuant to single scheme). But cf. Teleprompter of Erie, Inc. v.
City of Erie, 537 F. Supp. 6, 12-13 (W.D. Pa. 1981) (multiple bribes from employees of two
corporations to single councilman at one event did not establish pattern of racketeering).
" See, e.g., Tarlow, supra note 18, at 304. Tarlow states that "[slince virtually all busi-
ness transactions involve the use of the mails or telephones, a combination of RICO and
mail fraud could federalize all torts involving business transactions." Id.
148 See supra notes 24-40 and accompanying text.
"I See supra notes 24-32 and accompanying text.
10o See Blakey, supra note 18, at 341 & n.223.
5 Although fraud was mentioned in the legislative history, it always was referred to in
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and unintended. The courts have always been wary of extending
federal jurisdiction in the absence of an express congressional di-
rective.1 52 Indeed, the Supreme Court has stated that "unless Con-
gress conveys its purpose clearly, it will not be deemed to have
significantly changed the federal-state balance."'15 Courts have on
the context of organized crime, and usually in conjunction with other offenses. See, e.g.,
Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922, 922-23 (1970) (Statement of Findings and Purpose); 116
CONG. REC. 591 (1970) (remarks of Sen. McClellan) (describing fraudulent use by organized
crime of stolen securities to obtain loans). Professor Blakey implicitly acknowledges that a
broad reading of RICO will encompass nearly all commercial fraud but avers that this result
was Congress' intent. See Blakey, supra note 18, at 341. To support this argument, Blakey
cites to the addition of fraud to the statute, id. at 268, the overruling of objections to
RICO's breadth, see id. at 271-73, 276-79, and the proposition that the absence of specific
legislative history should not negate the general language of the statute, id. at 248 n.33
(citing Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333, 341 (1981), and Standefer v. United States,
447 U.S. 10, 20 n.12 (1980)). However, while it is clear that Congress intended a greater
federal involvement in traditional state police functions, see supra notes 27-30 and accom-
panying text, and was well aware that RICO would affect more than traditional organized
crime, see supra notes 33-37 and accompanying text, there is absolutely no indication that
Congress recognized that they were allowing virtually all civil fraud claims into federal
courts, see Moss v. Morgan Stanley Inc., 553 F. Supp. 1347, 1361 (S.D.N.Y.), affd on other
grounds, 719 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1983). This conclusion is supported by the fact that the bar at
large did not seem to recognize the implications of RICO until the late 1970's, several years
after the enactment of RICO. See supra note 108 and accompanying text. It is suggested
that to effect such a radical change in federal jurisprudence, a more specific and positive
manifestation of legislative intent should be required.
'(2 See, e.g., Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 479 (1977); United States v. En-
mons, 410 U.S. 396, 411-12 (1973); see Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., 430 U.S. 1, 41 (1977). In
Piper and Santa Fe, the Supreme Court refused to imply private causes of action under the
federal securities laws for possible violations of state corporation law in the absence of a
clear indication of congressional intent. See Santa Fe, 430 U.S. at 478-80; Piper, 430 U.S. at
40-41. A significant factor in Santa Fe was the Court's reluctance to create a federal law of
fiduciary obligations which would override "established state policies of corporate regulation
. ." 430 U.S. at 478-80; see also Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 84 (1975) ("it is entirely appro-
priate ... to relegate [plaintiffs] to whatever remedy is created by state law"). Similarly, in
Enmons, the Supreme Court refused to extend federal criminal jurisdiction under the
Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1982), to labor violence employed in pursuit of legitimate
union objectives. 410 U.S. at 411; cf. United States v. Gelb, 700 F.2d 875, 878-79 (2d Cir.)
cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 167 (1983). In Gelb, the Second Circuit narrowly interpreted the
plain language of Title XI of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, the Explosives Con-
trol Act, Pub. L. No. 91-452, tit. 11, § 1102, 84 Stat. 922, 952 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 841-
848 (1982)), and refused to extend federal criminal jurisdiction to common-law arson, 700
F.2d at 878-79; see United States v. Gere, 662 F.2d 1291, 1296 (9th Cir. 1981); United States
v. Birchfield, 486 F. Supp. 137, 138-39 (M.D. Tenn. 1980). But see United States v. Agrillo-
Ladlad, 675 F.2d 905, 911 (7th Cir.) (Congress intended broad definition of "explosive"),
cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 66 (1982); United States v. Poulos, 667 F.2d 939, 941-42 (10th Cir.
1982) (language of Act meant to cover numerous explosives not specifically listed).
15' United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 349 (1971); see also Rewis v. United States, 401
U.S. 808, 812 (1971). Although Bass was decided in the criminal context, the same principle
also has been applied in civil cases. See, e.g., Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 479
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more than one occasion interpreted statutes in apparent contradic-
tion to their plain language in order more closely to effectuate con-
gressional intent.154 Although Congress realized that RICO would
prompt more federal involvement in areas that traditionally had
been within the state's police power, there is no indication in the
legislative history that they intended to provide a private right of
action for mail or wire fraud violations. 155
(1977); Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 513 (1940). The Apex Court stated that
"[a]n intention to disturb the [federal-state] balance is not lightly to be imputed to Con-
gress." 310 U.S. at 513 (interpreting Sherman Act).
I" See, e.g., United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 201 (1979); Train v. Colorado
Pub. Interest Research Group, 426 U.S. 1, 10 (1976); United States v. Enmons, 410 U.S. 396,
399-400 (1973); Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 459 (1892). In
United Steelworkers, the Supreme Court considered whether the prohibition against "dis-
criminat[ion] ... because of... race" contained in subsections (a) and (d) of section 703,
title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a), (d) (1976), applied to volun-
tary, private affirmative action programs that discriminate in favor of minorities. 443 U.S. at
201. Despite the absence of any qualifying language in the statute, Justice Brennan, writing
for the majority, concluded that, when "read against the background of the legislative his-
tory ... and the historical context from which the Act arose," it was clear that the prohibi-
tion against discrimination on the basis of "race" did not apply in this instance. Id. at 201-
02. Justice Blackmun, in his concurrence, acknowledged that the legislative history did not
clearly support this holding, but concurred in the Court's result on the basis of "practical
and equitable" considerations that Congress might not have perceived. Id. at 209, 213
(Blackmun, J., concurring); see also supra notes 117-19 and accompanying text.
155 See supra note 40 and accompanying text; cf. Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551,
556 (1982) ("Congress, in enacting the securities laws, did not intend to provide a broad
federal remedy for all fraud") (citing Great W. Bank & Trust v. Kotz, 532 F.2d 1252, 1253
(9th Cir. 1976), and Bellah v. First Nat'l Bank, 495 F.2d 1109, 1114 (5th Cir. 1974)). In
addition to the added burden on the federal judiciary, there are policy reasons in favor of
allowing business disputes to be governed by state law. State fraud law has greater flex-
ibility than a strict treble damages formula. See, e.g., Hunter Contracting Co. v. Sanner
Contracting Co., 16 Ariz. App. 239, 245-46, 492 P.2d 735, 741-42 (1972) (punitive damages
not necessarily available simply because action sounds in fraud; there must be gross fraud or
malice); Boise Dodge, Inc. v. Clark, 92 Idaho 902, 907, 453 P.2d 551, 556 (1969) (liability for
punitive damages does not hinge on whether action sounded in tort or in contract);
Wedeman v. City Chevrolet Co., 278 Md. 524, 533, 366 A.2d 7, 13 (1976) (if aggravated
circumstances evincing wanton or reckless disregard for the rights of others are present,
then jury has discretion to award punitive damages). Generally, punitive damages are avail-
able only for gross fraud involving high moral culpability or as a means of deterrence for
frauds aimed at the general public. Axelrod v. CBS Publications, 185 N.J. Super. 359, 370-
71, 448 A.2d 1023, 1029 (App. Div. 1982); see Bryan Constr. Co. v. Thad Ryan Cadillac, Inc.,
300 So. 2d 444, 449 (Miss. 1974) (punitive damages allowed if fraud grossly unjustifiable);
Walker v. Sheldon, 10 N.Y.2d 401, 405, 179 N.E.2d 497, 498-99, 223 N.Y.S.2d 488, 491
(1961). Rigid mathematic formulas are seldom employed. See, e.g., Dodge City Motors, Inc.
v. Rogers, 16 Ariz. App. 24, 27, 490 P.2d 853, 854-56 (1971) ($500 actual, $10,000 punitive);
Fox v. Wilson, 211 Kan. 563, 565-68, 507 P.2d 252, 263, 268 (1973) ($176,269.78 actual dam-
ages, $5000 punitive damages); Bowen v. Johnson, 252 S.C. 423, 424-25, 166 S.E.2d 766, 767
(1969) ($3500 in punitive damages awarded for fraud in connection with $135.24 bill). In
some jurisdictions, evidence of the defendant's financial worth may be considered. See, e.g.,
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It is urged, therefore, that courts considering RICO claims ex-
amine the operative facts alleged in a RICO complaint for predi-
cate acts which go beyond violations of the mail or wire fraud stat-
utes. Plaintiffs who can prove no more than predicate violations of
these statutes should be relegated to existing remedies under state
law. If, however, a plaintiff is able to prove predicate offenses other
than simple fraud, for example, arson or extortion, he would be
able to recover on his RICO claim. 156 Under this approach, RICO
would still provide a federal remedy for frauds in which violence
was used or threatened, 157 frauds connected with labor racketeer-
ing,""5 frauds connected with bribery,55 and other types of frauds
connected with RICO predicate offenses.160 Such an approach, it is
submitted, would exclude from the ambit of RICO only those ordi-
nary business frauds which, although unquestionably reprehensi-
ble, were not within the realm of legislative contemplation when
RICO was enacted.
CONCLUSION
Courts have imposed certain restrictive judicial glosses on
claims brought under section 1964(c) which run contrary to the
Legislature's intent and the purpose of the statute, and which in-
Tahoe Village Realty, S.A.W. Co. v. DeSmet, 95 Nev. 131, 136, 590 P.2d 1158, 1161 (1979);
Basden v. Mills, 472 P.2d 889, 896 (Okla. 1970).
1" The American Bar Association has recommended a restriction on RICO actions sim-
ilar to that suggested herein. See ABA: REPORT TO THE HousE. OF DELEGATES, SECTION ON
CRIMINAL JUSTCE 7-9 (1982). The ABA recommended that to find a pattern of racketeering
activity, at least one offense other than mail or wire fraud, interstate transportation of sto-
len goods, or the sale or receipt of stolen goods must exist. Id. at 8.
15 Among the possible violent predicate offenses sufficient to state a RICO claim would
be "any act or threat involving murder, kidnaping,. . . arson, robbery, [or] extortion" that
is punishable under state law by imprisonment for more than 1 year. 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (1)(A)
(1982). In addition, violent federal offenses under 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1982) (relating to inter-
ference with commerce through actual or attempted robbery, extortion or physical violence),
would be covered.
'1 Proscribed labor offenses under RICO include violations of 18 U.S.C. § 664 (1982)
(embezzlement from pension and welfare funds), 29 U.S.C. § 186 (1976) (relating to restric-
tions on payments and loans to labor organizations), and 29 U.S.C. § 501(c) (1976) (relating
to embezzlement of union funds). See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(B), (C) (1982).
159 State law bribery offenses punishable by 1 year or more in prison serve as predicate
violations under RICO, see 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(A) (1982), as do federal offenses indictable
under sections 201 (bribery of public officials and witnesses) and 224 (sports bribery), see id.
§ 1961(1)(B) (1982).
150 Other possible predicate acts include, inter alia, narcotics dealing, see 18 U.S.C. §
1961(1)(A), (D) (1982), counterfeiting, id. §§ 471-473, and gambling offenses, id. §§ 1084,
1953, 1955; see id. § 1961(1).
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correctly preclude recovery to large segments of the class intended
to be benefitted by RICO. These restrictions should be rejected.
Congress' intent was not drastically to change existing securities
law nor to preempt state common-law fraud. Thus, actions which
fall within the technical scope of RICO, but in essence state noth-
ing more than securities violations, should be governed solely by
the relevant securities laws. Similarly, suits which rely merely on
two or more common-law frauds conducted through an enterprise,
albeit with the use of the mails or the wires, should be dismissed as
outside the scope of the statute. If, however, other acts proscribed
by section 1961(1) are included in the complaint, the complaint
should stand because it exhibits a pattern of racketeering activity
as intended by the statute. This approach would ensure that ex-
isting statutory, regulatory, and common-law systems concerning
fraud retain their validity, while preserving an avenue of redress
for those Congress intended to protect, the direct victims of profes-
sional criminals.
John F. Cove, Jr.
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